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BAKER V. CANADA (MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION) AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
SHARRYN AIKEN AND SHEENA SCOTT*
RESUMEI
Les auteures analysent, du point de vue des droits des enfants, la porte de la ddcision
de la Cour supreme du Canada dans la cause Baker. Apr~s avoir d6limit6 le cadre de
rdglementation et les faits relatifs ' la cause, elles identifient les arguments cls
prdsent6s par les parties et donnent un aper~u de la rdponse donnde par la Cour a ces
arguments. Les aspects de 1' arr& concernant sp6cifiquement les droits des enfants sont
analys6s afin de faire ressortir les solutions positives du jugement et les r6ponses qu'il
reste A r6gler. Les r6percussions de 1'arr& sont analys6es selon la r6action du public
et la r6action judiciaire. Enfin, les auteures abordent le r6le des cours sup6rieures
provinciales relativement aux approches contradictoires utilis6es par ces tribunaux en
ce qui a trait aux droits des enfants dans un contexte d'immigration. Les auteures
concluent leur article en formulant des suggestions favorisant une meilleure connaiss-
ance administrative et judiciaire des droits des enfants dans les causes d'immigration,
que ceux-ci poss~dent leur citoyennet6 ou non.
The law as it relates to children has traditionally considered them to be
somehow inferior beings - not yet adults - and, therefore, not yet capable of
expressing views of sufficient maturity and understanding to be considered
legally relevant. Although genuinely concerned with promoting children's
best interests ... the law has tended to go about its business without the direct
input of the children whose fate it is deciding. But if we are to achieve true
and complete justice, we must recognize that children are an indispensable
part of the process, who have the right to speak, and to be listened to with
respect and understanding.1
* Sharryn Aiken is a Visiting Lecturer at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Sheena Scott is
former Director of Justice for Children and Youth. The authors were co-counsel representing the
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, Defence for Children International-Canada
and the Canadian Council for Refugees as intervenors in the Baker case, infra note 10. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the editorial assistance of Alexander Sabharwal and the helpful comments
of Lome Sossin, Roger Rowe and Audrey Macklin on a draft of this paper.
1. Justice C. L'Heureux-Dub6, "The Child and the Family BreakupfThe Child in Need of Protection" in
A New Vision for A Non-Violent World: Justice for Each Child: Proceedings of the 4 th Biennial
International Conference of the International Association of Women Judges (Cowansville, Qc.: Les
ditions Yvons Blais Inc., 1999) at 358.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically laws in Canada and around the world approached children as chattels,
property to be allocated according to their parents' interests. Children were not fully
legal persons with rights of their own deserving of protection. The latter part of the
twentieth century witnessed dramatic progress in recognizing and respecting children's
rights in Canada. In Ontario, for example, laws relating to child welfare and protection,
mental health commitment, as well as custody and access reflect an evolved, albeit
imperfect, recognition of the human rights of children. 2 An important watershed for
children's rights was achieved in 1991, when Canada ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child.3 The Convention is the fruit of a remarkable
international consensus that children are persons with distinct rights and needs.
4
In ratifying the Convention, together with one hundred and ninety other states, Canada
pledged, inter alia, to ensure that the best interests of children would be a primary
consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies. 5 Canada
also pledged to ensure that children are provided an opportunity to be heard in any
judicial or administrative proceeding affecting the child, in accordance with the age
2. See e.g. Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 11, as am. by Advocacy, Consent and
Substitute Decisions Statute Law Amendment Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2. See also Mental Health Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, as am. by Consent and Capacity Statute Law Amendment Act, 1992, S.O. 1992,
c. 32, and as am. by Advocacy Consent and Substitute Decisions Statute Law Amendment Act, ibid.,
s. 72.
3. 20 November 1989, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
UN Doc. AIRES/44/25 (entered into force 2 September 1990, entered into force for Canada 13
December 1991) [hereinafter CRC or Convention].
4. See M.S. Pais, "The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child" in International Association of
Women Judges, supra note 1 at 23. It is interesting to note that the Convention entered into force in
less than a year, a unique achievement which no other United Nations instrument can claim.
5. CRC, supra note 3, art. 3(1). For a discussion of the "best interests" principle in the domestic
context, see N. Bala, "The Best Interests of the Child" (1995) 6 Supreme Court L.R. 453; M.
Freeman, 'The Best Interests of the Child: Is the Best Interests of the Child in the Best Interests of
Children?" (1997) 11 Int'l J.L. Pol'y & Fam. 360; N. Bala, "The Best Interests of the Child in the
Post-Modernist Era: A Central but Illusive and Limited Concept" in H. Niman & G.P. Sadvari, eds.,
Special Lectures 2000: Family Law: A Colloquium on "Best Interests of the Child": New Perspec-
tives on the Resolution of Custody Disputes (Toronto: The Law Society of Upper Canada, Depart-
ment of Continuing Legal Education, 1999). The full text of article 3 states:
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary
for his or her well being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents,
legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end,
shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for
the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by
competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and
suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.
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and maturity of the child.6 Canadian immigration law and provisions relating to
deportation in particular have lagged far behind in terms of according children rights
to have their views and wishes considered as well as to participate directly in
proceedings affecting them. The Committee on the Rights of the Child,7 in its
Concluding Observations on Canada in 1995, identified this critical lacuna:
... The Committee regrets that the principles of non-discrimination, of the best
interests of the child have not always been given adequate weight by administrative
bodies dealing with the situation of refugees or immigrant children ... The Commit-
tee specifically regrets the delays in dealing with reunification of family in ... cases
where refugee or immigrant children born in Canada may be separated from their
parents facing deportation order.
8
Contemporaneous with the U.N. Committee's comments on Canada's report, the
Federal Court of Appeal determined that the Canadian born children of parents facing
deportation to Poland had no relevant interests worthy of consideration. Speaking for
a unanimous court, D6cary J.A. noted that,
The appellant parents' decision to take their children to Poland with them or to
leave them with family members living in Canada is a decision which is their own
to make and which, to all appearances, they will make in the best interests of the
children. The Canadian Government has nothing to do with this decision, which is
of strictly private interest. There is no government action in this case which could
bring the Charter into play.
6. CRC, ibid., arts. 12(1), (2). The full text of article 12 states:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the view
of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard
in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural
rules of national law.
7. The Committee is a body of ten experts who are elected by states but serve in their personal capacity
to monitor state compliance with the treaty. Members serve for a period of four years and are eligible
for re-election if they are nominated again at the expiry of their term. Pursuant to art. 44 of the CRC,
ibid., Canada must submit a performance report with respect to measures it has adopted to give effect
to the rights enshrined in the Convention every five years and defend the report before the Commit-
tee. Canada submitted its first report to the Committee in 1994 and the Committee evaluated
Canada's report in its Concluding Observations on Canada the following year (Committee on the
Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on Canada, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.37 (1995)).
8. Committee on the Rights of the Child, ibid. The full text can be found online: Canadian Heritage,
Human Rights Directorate Homepage <httpJ/www.pch.gc ca/ddp-hrd/ ENGUSH/ rotc/concobs.htm>. The
full text of Canada's reports to all U.N. treaty bodies, as well as the concluding observations of the
treaty bodies in response to these reports, can also be found online: Canadian Heritage, Human Rights
Directorate Homepage <http://www.pch.gc.ca/ddp-hrd/ENGLISHreports.htm>. A record of the
Committee's official documents is available online: United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights Homepage <http://www.unhchr.ch>.
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[Tlhe appellant children have no Charter right to demand that the Canadian Gov-
ernment not apply to their parents the penalties provided for violation of Canadian
immigration laws.
[A] child has no constitutional right never to be separated from its parents... .9
The Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration)10 represents an incremental but important advance in
the development of Canadian jurisprudence relating to the rights of children in
immigration proceedings and beyond. One of the central issues in the case was the
relevance of the Convention's provisions concerning the best interests of children to
the exercise of administrative discretion.l The Supreme Court's decision reinforced
the significance of the United Nations Convention in domestic law and decision
making. The importance of valuing the rights, needs and interests of children in
decisions affecting them has been affirmed. Yet the Baker decision leaves a number
of critical questions unanswered. The participatory rights of children in "humanitarian
and compassionate" applications 12 remain limited and there are disturbing signs, in
the wake of the Court's decision in Baker, that the federal government remains
uncommitted to the full realization of children's rights in the immigration context.
9. Langner v. Canada (M.E.L) (1995), 184 N.R. 230 at 233-234,97 F.T.R. 118n, 29 C.R.R. (2d) 184
(C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1995), 193 N.R. 400n, 30 C.R.R. (2d) 188n [hereinafter
Langner]. See also Naredo v. Canada (M.E.L) (1995), 184 N.R. 352, 96 F.T.R. 240 (C.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused (1995), 198 N.R. 397n; Balaga v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration)(1995), 106 F.T.R. 71.
It should be noted that the right to family unity and protection of the family unit is recognized in both
international and regional human rights instruments, but is not explicitly articulated in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. See Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), arts. 16(3),
25(1), (2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 IJ..M. 368, arts. 17, 23(1), 24(1) (entered into force 23 March 1976,
accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46, arts. 10, 12
(entered into force 3 January 1976); CRC, supra note 3, arts. 8, 9, 16; OAS, Ninth International
Conference of American States, Final Act, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
OR OEA/Ser.LIV/II.23/Doc.21, rev. 6, arts. V, VI (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration]; Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, rev. 5, 4 E.H.R.R. 417,
21 l.L.M. 58, art. 18 (entered into force 21 October 1986); Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. 5, art. 8(1).
10. (1999), 174 D.L.R. (41h) 193, 243 N.R. 22, 14 Admin. L.R. (3d) 173, online: QL (SCJ) [hereinafter
Baker cited to S.C.J.].
11. A significant issue which the Court addressed but which will not be canvassed extensively in this
paper is the appropriate standard of review to be applied to the exercise of administrative discretion.
Other issues, also considered by the Court and which will be examined briefly below, include
whether section 83 of the Immigration Act restricts the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court of
Appeal to the question which has been certified by the Federal Court Trial Division and the scope of
the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
12. Hereinafter H & C applications.
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This paper examines the implications of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
the Baker case from a "children's rights" perspective. The arguments raised by the
various litigants regarding the relevance of the CRC in reviewing discretionary
decisions under the Immigration Act 13 as well as the Court's responses to those
arguments are canvassed. The administrative law issues relating to the standard of
judicial review to be applied to discretionary decision making and the scope of the
duty of fairness are examined through a child-centred lens. While many facets of
judgment do not impinge directly on children's rights, an overview of the broad sweep
of the Court's reasoning is provided in order to assess the decision's impact on children
as both stakeholders and participants in the immigration program. 14 After commenting
on the decision itself, we then examine both public and judicial reaction to the Baker
ruling with a view to highlighting the gaps in the legal framework for protecting
children's rights. Finally, the role of provincial superior courts in protecting the
independent rights and interests of children threatened with a risk of harm within the
immigration context will be addressed with reference to the conflicting approaches
adopted by these courts. We conclude by urging greater administrative and judicial
recognition of children's rights within a regulatory scheme that has become increas-
ingly resistant to human rights claims.
I. THE IMMIGRATION ACT AND THE CONTEXT OF THE CASE
Section 9(1) of the Immigration Act provides that as a general rule, every immigrant
shall apply for and obtain a visa before appearing at a port of entry. There are, however,
some important exceptions to this rule, including special procedures for live-in care
givers and Convention refugees to apply for permanent residence from within Can-
ada.' 5 In addition, subsection 114(2) of the Act provides a residual authority to the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to exempt anyone from any of the require-
13. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2 [hereinafter Act].
14. An in-depth analysis of the administrative law dimensions of the Baker case is beyond the scope of this
paper. For insightful commentary in that regard, see, D. Brown & J. Evans, "Discretionary Justice:
Reasons and Reasonableness: Case Comment on Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and knmigra-
tonJ', onlime Canvasback Publishing Homepage <http'//www.brownandevans.com/ case.comm.html>;
L. Sossin, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 Terms (2000)
11 Supreme Court L.R. (forthcoming); D. Mullan, "Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) - A Defining Moment in Canadian Administrative Law" (1999) 7 R.A.L. 145.
15. People accepted into the Live-in Care Giver Program must apply from outside Canada. They are
granted an employment authorization and temporary visa to come to Canada. After satisfying an
immigration officer that they have worked for two years of their first three years in Canada
providing child care or other home support care, they are then eligible to apply for landing from
inside the country. Section 2(1) of the Immigration Regulations 1978 provides the definition of
live-in care giver and s. 20(1.1) sets out the criteria for qualifying for the program (S.O.R.78-17
as am. by S.O.R./93-44 [hereinafter Regulations]. A Convention refugee must first be deter-
mined eligible to claim refugee status in Canada according to criteria set out in s. 46.01(1) of
the Act and then they must satisfy the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board that they have a "well-founded fear of persecution" as defined
in s. 2(1) of the Act.
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ments of the Act or otherwise facilitate their admission owing to the existence of
"compassionate or humanitarian considerations." Section 2.1 of the Regulations16
implements the exemption in the same terms as those in subsection 114(2). Neither
the Act nor the Regulations provide any indication of the meaning to be ascribed to
"humanitarian or compassionate" nor of the procedures applicable to an individual
seeking such an exemption. Administrative guidelines have been developed and are
contained in the Immigration Manual.17 A series of changes introduced to the immigra-
tion guidelines in 1999, shortly before the Supreme Court considered the Baker case,
did not substantially alter the basic formulation. 18 Applicants bear the burden of
satisfying an immigration officer that their personal circumstances are such that the
hardship of having to obtain a visa outside Canada in the normal manner would be
either (i) unusual and undeserved or (ii) disproportionate. There is an application fee
of $500 for the primary applicant and there is no limit on the number of times the
process may be invoked.
In practice applications are rarely given favourable consideration unless the applicant
can demonstrate successful establishment in addition to whatever hardship might be
suffered in their home country. A request for humanitarian and compassionate consid-
eration is processed as an administrative review. While the principles of fundamental
justice have afforded a full oral hearing to refugee claimants, 19 H & C applicants have
16. Ibid.
17. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Immigration Manual. The Manual is available online: Citizen-
ship and Immigration Homepage <http://www.cic.gc.ca>.
18. Two changes, however, merit some attention. Under the former guidelines a special category of
"Public Policy" reasons for granting exemptions included a provision for "illegal de facto residents"
who had established themselves in Canada after a period of many years and sought to regularize their
status (ibid. "Examination and Enforcement", Chapter IE-9, s. 9.06). This category was the only
remedy for many women who came to Canada to take up positions as domestic workers outside legal
channels. The underlying policy rationale for this category seemed to be a recognition that people
who had severed their ties with their home country and demonstrated an ability to be self sufficient
in Canada over a significant period of time should not be subject to indefinite penalty for gaining
illegal admission. The new guidelines, however, specifically proscribe such recognition, noting instead
that positive consideration may be warranted when individuals have been in Canada for a prolonged
period of time due to "circumstances beyond their control" (ibid., "Inland Processing", Chapter IP-5,
s. 8.7). The second revision relates to the category under the former guidelines of "Situations
Involving Family Dependency" (ibid., Chapter IE-9, s. 9.07). In the new guidelines this category has
been elaborated and clearly extended to address the case of "Separation of parents and dependent
children" (ibid., Chapter IP-5, s. 8.5). Immigration officers are advised that the "removal of a
status-less individual from Canada may have an impact in relation to family members who do have a
legal right to remain (ie., permanent residents or Canadian citizens). In evaluating such cases officers
are directed to "balance the different and important interests at stake." Furthermore, international
human rights standards such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child may be considered (ibid.).
Notwithstanding the permissive language, the inclusion of this reference is an improvement over the
former guidelines. The revised guidelines were not before the Court in Baker as Ms. Baker's case
had been determined under the former IE-9 policy framework.
19. In the case of Singh v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422, 58 N.R. 1
[hereinafter cited to S.C.R.], Wilson J. found that the procedures which were in effect at that time for
determining refugee status did not comply with s. 7 of the Charter supra note 9. In particular,
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no right to a hearing or even an interview. For many years the courts refused to accept
that an applicant seeking judicial review of an immigration officer's decision was
entitled to anything more than minimal fairness in what was otherwise characterized
as a wholly discretionary decision. 20 Humanitarian and compassionate applications
can be made in the context of any application to the Department but arise most
frequently in cases like that of Mavis Baker, individuals already in Canada and seeking
special consideration to remain.
Ms. Baker is a woman from Jamaica who came to Canada in 1981 as a visitor "looking
for a better life." 2 1 She overstayed her visit and remained in Canada, supporting
herself as a live-in domestic worker for eleven years. During that time she had four
children: the eldest was born in 1985, twins were born in 1989 and the youngest child
was born in 1992. Ms. Baker was self-sufficient until suffering an attack of post partum
psychosis following the birth of her youngest child. While undergoing treatment, the
twins were placed in the custody of their father, a permanent resident of Canada, and
the other two went into foster care. As her health improved, the two children placed
in foster care returned to live with Ms. Baker. The other two remained with their father,
but Ms. Baker and her former partner maintained a hybrid family in which the children
visited back and forth between the two homes. It deserves mention that Ms. Baker's
former partner had a new spouse and his life was rooted in Toronto. An affidavit clearly
indicated that he lacked the means to support all four of the Baker children in addition
to other children of his own and that he was not prepared to move to Jamaica in the
event that Ms. Baker was deported.22 In effect the children faced the impossible
situation of having to "choose" between siblings and parents on the one hand and their
country on the other. At pre-removal and removal interviews for Ms. Baker, counsel
requested that her children be permitted to speak and to have independent counsel.
The children were not allowed to participate directly.2 3
Ms. Baker learned that her H & C application was unsuccessful by a letter that simply
indicated that her application had been denied. The letter was signed by a senior
immigration officer and no reasons were provided. Ms. Baker's counsel subsequently
requested and was provided with notes made by the first level immigration officer who
had reviewed her file. These notes contained that officer's reasons for recommending
that the superior officer deny the application. The notes included the following
observations:
Wilson J. emphasized that where matters of credibility were at issue, the principles of fundamental
justice required an oral hearing (ibid. at 212-216). This ruling resulted in a complete overhaul of
status determination procedures and the creation of the Immigration and Refugee Board.
20. The nadir and leading case on this point is Shah v. Canada (M.E.L) (1994), 170 N.R. 238, 81 F.T.R.
320n, 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 82 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Shah]. See M. Bossin, "'After a Thorough and
Sympathetic Review': The State of Humanitarian Applications in Canada" (1999) 14 J.L. & Soc.
Pol'y 107.
21. Affidavit of M. Baker (2 February 1997) at para. 3.
22. Ibid. at para. 27.
23. Baker, supra note 10 (Appellant's factum at paras. 4, 11).
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This case is a catastrophy [sic]...
The PC is a paranoid schizophrenic and on welfare. She has no qualifications other
than as a domestic. She has FOUR CHILDREN IN JAMAICA AND ANOTHER
FOUR BORN HERE. She will, of course, be a tremendous strain on our social
welfare systems for (probably) the rest of her life. There are no H&C factors other
than her FOUR CANADIAN-BORN CHILDREN. Do we let her stay because of
that? I am of the opinion that Canada can no longer afford this type of generosity.
24
Ms. Baker's counsel sought judicial review of the decision, asking that the refusal be
set aside. The Federal Court - Trial Division dismissed the application and certified
the following question for appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal:
Given that the Immigration Act does not expressly incorporate the language of
Canada's international obligations with respect to the International Convention on
the Rights of the Child, must federal immigration authorities treat the best interests
of the Canadian child as a primary consideration in assessing an applicant under s.
114(2) of the Immigration Act?25
The Federal Court of Appeal limited its consideration of the appeal to the question
stated by the Trial Division. The answer it gave to that question was a definitive no.
Strayer J.A. dismissed the relevance of the Convention as it related to the Baker
children for three principal reasons. First, not having been incorporated into domestic
law, the Convention could not constitutionally affect the discretion granted by a statute
of Parliament (or a provincial legislature), as this would offend the separation of
powers. Furthermore, although the interests of children of prospective deportees are
relevant, the Convention could not prescribe, in a manner that is enforceable by the
courts, a priority for the best interests of the child in a proceeding that concerned the
deportation of a parent and not a child. Second, ratification of the Convention did not
create a "legitimate expectation" that public administration would be conducted in
accordance with its provisions. The Court concluded that the doctrine of legitimate
expectation creates procedural rights only, while the interests of the children are a
substantive matter.
26
24. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 5.
25. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1995), 101 F.T.R. 110, 31 Imm. L.R. (2d)
150 at 159, Simpson J. (T.D.).
26. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1996), 142 D.L.R. (4th) 554, [1997] 2
F.C. 127 (C.A.). See United Nations Children's Fund, The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child: A Practical Guide to its Use in Canadian Courts by V. Yolles (Toronto: UNICEF
Canada, 1998) at 40. Note that the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" is a British concept that has
been imported into Canadian law in a somewhat confused fashion. In Bendahmane v. Canada
(M.E.I.) (1989), 95 N.R. 385, [1989] 3 F.C. 16, 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 20, the doctrine was successfully
applied to an immigration case. See D. Wright, "Rethinking the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations
in Canadian Administrative Law" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 139; P.A. MacPherson, 'Ihe Legiti-
mate Expectation Doctrine and its Application to Administrative Policy" (1995-96) 9 Can. J. Admin.
L. & Pract. 141; D. Shapiro, "Legitimate Expectations and its Application to Canadian Immigration
Law" (1992) 8 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 282.
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Counsel for Ms. Baker appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada and was
joined by three public interest intervenors, the Canadian Council of Churches, the
Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and a coalition consisting of the Canadian
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, the Defence for Children International-
Canada and the Canadian Council for Refugees. The Court agreed to consider the
appeal, but refused the appellant's motion to set a number of constitutional questions.
Thus the appeal did not encompass a direct challenge to subsection 114(2) of the
Immigration Act. It was framed primarily in terms of the role of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms and the CRC in interpreting the limits of administrative discretion. It
should be noted as well that the Court refused leave to intervene to the Baker children
and a fourth group, a coalition consisting of the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the
Congress of Black Women of Canada and the Jamaican Canadian Association. 27 This
group sought to assist the Court in addressing the problem of racial bias in immigration
law, policy and decision making.
II. AT THE SUPREME COURT: THE ARGUMENTS
At the Supreme Court, the appellant's arguments focused on the content of the duty
of fairness in the exercise of executive discretion. The appellant argued that the
immigration officer's notes gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. 28 The
appellant also argued that the CRC was binding on immigration officials when
exercising their authority and discretion under the Act. The appellant acknowledged
that in order for a treaty to be directly enforceable in Canadian courts, it had to be
incorporated into domestic law. 29 However, the appellant asserted that, in the absence
of the Convention's explicit incorporation into the Immigration Act, the Court could
infer "implicit incorporation" by reference to the Act's overriding objectives and
values. These objectives included an express recognition of the need to facilitate
family reunification and to fulfil Canada's international legal obligations. 30
27. Baker, supra note 10 (Order of Major J., 31 March 1998); see also ibid. (Factum of proposed
intervenors, African Canadian Legal Clinic et al.).
28. Ibid. (Appellant's factum).
29. Canada operates on the basis of the "transformation" theory where conventional international law is
concerned. A treaty must be directly implemented by domestic legislation to become part of Cana-
dian law. See generally H.M. Kindred et al., International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied
in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993) at 147-48; D. Bassan, 'The Canadian
Charter and Public International Law: Redefining the State's Power to Deport Aliens" (1996) 36
Osgoode Hall L. 583.
30. Baker, supra note 10 (Appellant's factum at para. 119). Act, supra note 13, ss. 3(c), (g). Arguably
further support for the conclusion that the Immigration Act implemented the CRC is that ratification
took place only after extensive federal-provincial consultation and that representations by officials in
both domestic and international fora demonstrate a clear intention on the part of federal, provincial
and territorial governments to give effect to its obligations under the CRC.
The theory of "implicit incorporation" has been advanced by Anne F. Bayefsky in International
Human Rights Law: Use in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths,
1992) at 30-63. She argues that an absence of express reference to Canada's international human
rights treaties in the Charter and other federal and provincial statutes, "should not be fatal to a
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The appellant argued that the duty of fairness must be interpreted in light of Canada's
obligations under the CRC and that therefore the best interests of the child should be
a primary consideration in a humanitarian and compassionate application as part of
the balancing of state and party interests. 31 Other rights conferred by the CRC required
that the applicant, her children and the other parent/parental figure should be given
notice of the proceeding, notice of the right to counsel and an opportunity to make
written and oral submissions on the removal of the parent; and reasons for the decision
should be provided. The appellant also cited article 23(1) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and article VI of the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man, both of which are ratified by Canada and recognize the right
of everyone to establish a family and to have it afforded protection.32 The appellant
relied on the doctrine of legitimate expectation to bolster these submissions. In this
context, the appellant argued that an immigration officer's discretion must be exer-
cised in accordance with principles enunciated in the Charter and which mirrored
those in the CRC. The Charter arguments were grounded in section 7 and the principles
of fundamental justice. Sections 2, 6 and 15 were also relied upon as informing the
scope and content of section 7 and in their own right.33
The intervenors elaborated on distinct facets of the issues presented by the appellant. The
Charter Committee on Poverty Issues focused on the legal effect of the CRC as a human
rights treaty over the exercise of discretion under subsection 114(2) of the Immigration
Act. The Charter Committee set out the two main routes by which international human
rights treaties to which Canada is a party structure administrative decision making.34 First,
international human rights law informs the content of Charter rights, which in turn can
be used to interpret the statutory limits of administrative discretion. Second, interna-
tional human rights treaties can be used in statutory interpretation, based on the
presumption of legislative compliance with international law.
In their factum, the Charter Committee elaborated on the two interpretive principles
established by the Supreme Court in Slaight Communications v. Davidson.35 The first
determination that they are indeed implementing legislation, or intended to 'give effect to' Canada's
human rights treaty obligations. On the contrary, the overall policy of facilitating Canada's adher-
ence to its international obligations, without undermining the nature of Canadian federalism, would
be adequately served by acknowledging the stated guideline of the Department of External Affairs
that implementing legislation may be enacted "without express reference to the treaty" (ibid. at 62-3,
citing Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqu6 (24 June 1987) at 1). This approach
was not fully elaborated by the appellant in Baker, although it was advanced in a supporting affidavit
by David Matas submitted with the appellant's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
It has not been adopted by Canadian courts.
31. Appellant's Factum, ibid. at para. 100, citing CRC, supra note 3, art. 3(1).
32. CRC, ibid., art. 12; ICCPR and American Declaration, supra note 9.
33. The appellant advanced the argument that freedom of association under s. 2 of the Charter includes
the right of individual members of a family to associate with each other. This argument was not fully
developed by any of the parties in the Baker case.
34. The Charter Committee did not adopt Bayefsky's theory of "implicit incorporation" as advanced by
the appellant (Bayefsky, supra note 30).
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principle, which the Charter Committee referred to as the "international human rights
presumption", was extracted from the following statement by Dickson C.J.C.:
..[The Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as
great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights docu-
ments which Canada has ratified.36
The Charter Committee described the second principle as the "Charter compliance
presumption", requiring statutes to be interpreted as far as possible so as not to
empower administrative actors to violate Charter rights.37 They identified the pre-
sumption of conformity of statutes with international law as a "rule of law" doctrine
tied to the institutional role of the Courts in promoting fundamental legality. Accord-
ingly, it was submitted that there is no basis for the Federal Court of Appeal's concern
that the executive, by ratifying the CRC, is fettering the discretion of Parliament. Such
reasoning would "undermine the very purpose of judicial review in a society based on
rule of law." While Parliament can legislate contrary to international law, it
must enact provisions that clearly and unavoidably conflict with international law to
rebut the presumption of compliance with international law. Where it does so,
international law will have no direct effect on the statute. Where it has not done so,
courts must strive to interpret domestic statutes and the constraints on discretionary
decision-making in compliance with international law.38
The Charter Committee proceeded to develop the arguments raised by the appellant
concerning, inter alia, the violations of the Convention and sections 7 and 15 of the
Charter. They identified the specific examples of intersecting stereotypes reflected in
the immigration officer's notes concerning Ms. Baker's identity and attributed status
as a Black woman, single mother, social assistance recipient, psychiatric survivor and
immigrant. The Charter Committee highlighted the extent to which the officer's
prejudices resulted in clear discrimination against Ms. Baker and her children. With
regard. to the children, the Charter Committee placed particular emphasis on the
discriminatory treatment they suffered as result of their economic disadvantage. The
children were directly harmed through the treatment of their mother and the fact that
her status as a social assistance recipient counted heavily against allowing her to
remain in Canada. The Charter Committee argued that article 2(1) of the Convention
35. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 416, 93 N.R. 183 [hereinafter Slaight Communications cited
to S.C.R.] as cited in Baker, supra note 10 (Factum of the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues).
36. Slaight Communications, ibid at 1056; see also Factum of the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues
at paras. 52-3.
37. The principle was articulated in the following terms by Lamer J.: "... Legislation conferring an
imprecise discretion must therefore be interpreted as not allowing the Charter rights to be infringed.
Accordingly, an [administrative] adjudicator exercising delegated powers does not have the power to
make an order that would result in an infringement of the Charter, and he exceeds his jurisdiction if
he does so." Ibid. at 1078.
38. Baker, supra note 10 (Factum of the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues at paras. 52-53). See also,
R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1994) at 206-207.
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included a non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds of discrimination and that
economic disadvantage "can be viewed as being located in the interaction of the
enumerated grounds of 'social origin' and 'property' and the open-ended 'other
status." 39 It deserves mention at this juncture that neither the appellant nor any of the
intervenors fully elaborated upon the anti-Black racism inherent in the officer's notes
or provided an analysis of the extent to which the officer's individuated prejudices
might be understood in terms of the broader and historic problem of systemic racism in
Canada's immigration program.4 0 In this regard, the appellant's litigation strategy was
mapped out collaboratively with the intervenors and proceeded on the assumption that
the African Canadian Legal Clinic would be the most appropriate voice to engage the
Court on the issue of anti-Black racism. When Major J. denied the Clinic's motion for
leave to intervene, the Court contributed to the erasure of race and racism as defining
elements of the case. We will revisit this issue in our commentary on the Court's
judgment.
The Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law et al. argued that security
of the person, as guaranteed by section 7, afforded the Baker children a constitutionally
protected right to psychological and emotional integrity as well as to protection and
preservation of their family. Further, the children enjoyed a liberty interest in choosing
their place of residence, which was supported by their right to remain in Canada
pursuant to the mobility rights guarantee of section 6 of the Charter. These rights could
only be violated in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. They argued
that the operative principles of fundamental justice were: the best interests of the child
test, the right to be heard and the right to be free from discrimination. An integral part
39. CRC, supra note 3, art. 2(1); (Factum of the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues, ibid at para. 42).
The full text of art. 2 of the CRC states:
1. States parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention
to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective
of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability,
birth or other status.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected
against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities,
expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians or family members.
40. Numerous scholars, public commissions and even the courts have recognized the extent to which
anti-Black racism is a pervasive feature of the Canadian social and legal fabric. See e.g.: R. v. Parks
(1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1994) 72 O.A.C. 159n, 17 O.R.
(3d) xvii, 87 C.C.C. (3d) vi, in which the court took note of the overwhelming evidence of anti-Black
racism in Canada; F. Henry et al., The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society (Toronto:
Harcourt Brace & Co., 1995) at 59-101; C. Aylward, Canadian Critical Race Theory: Racism and
the Law (Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 1999); Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the
Ontario Criminal Justice System (Ontario: Queen's Printer, 1995) at ii (Co-chairs M. Gittens & D.
Cole); Stephen Lewis Report on Race Relations in Ontario (Ontario: Queen's Printer, 1992). With
regard to racism in the immigration program in particular, see D. Matas, "Racism in Canadian
Immigration Policy" in C. James ed., Perspectives on Racism and the Human Services Sector
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); L.M. Jakubowski, Immigration and the Legalization of
Racism (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1997); and V. Knowles, Strangers at our Gates: Canadian
Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-1997 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997).
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of the best interests test and the right to be heard was consideration of the views and
wishes of the child. The intervenors submitted that each one of these principles of
fundamental justice had a counterpart in the CRC. The nature and content of the CRC
was thereby incorporated into domestic law through the Charter. They noted the
significance of Japan's formal reservation that article 9(1) of the CRC be interpreted
"not to apply to a case where a child is separated from his or her parents as a result of
deportation in accordance with immigration law." It was emphasized that Canada did
not make any such reservation. 4 1 The content of the rights and the appropriate tests
to be employed coincided with the submissions of the appellant, focusing on the issue
of standing for the children and consideration of best interests, including wishes as a
primary consideration. In the coalition's submission,
Recognition of children as independent rights-bearers with rights separate and apart
from their parents is integral to a legally sound analysis. To say that the parent can
and will put forward a child's case is to ignore the child as an individual and legal
entity and to fly in the face of the Convention, the Charter and the principles of
natural and fundamental justice.
4 2
The Canadian Council of Churches framed its arguments on the basis of the import-
ance of access to an effective remedy for Ms. Baker and for her children. The Council
argued that international human rights instruments supported an independent right of
access to a meaningful remedy. This right was specifically grounded in the CRC by
41. Baker, supra note 10 (Factum of the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law et aL, at
para. 24); R. Hodgkin & P. Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (New York: UNICEF, 1998) at 122-123. Canada has entered only two reservations to the
Convention: to art. 21 with respect to aboriginal adoption and to art. 37(c) with respect to youth
detention. The full text of art. 9 of the CRC, supra note 3, states:
1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents
against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is
necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a
particular case such as one involving child abuse or neglect of the child by the parents,
or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to
the child's place of residence.
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested
parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make
their views known.
3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a
regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.
4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as
the detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from
any cause while the person is in custody of the State) of one or both parents or of the
child, the State Party shall, upon request, provide the essential information concerning
the whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless the provision of the
information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. States Parties shall
further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself entail no adverse
consequences for the person(s) concerned.
42. Ibid. (Factum of the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law etal., at para. 4).
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way of articles 9 (the right of children to maintain relations and contact with both
parents and the corresponding duty on the state not to separate children from their
parents unless it is in their best interests) and 10 (the right of children and their parents
to leave any country and to enter their own for purposes of reunion or the maintenance
of the child-parent relationship). 43 The Council emphasized that access to interna-
tional and regional human rights tribunals is granted in cases where the complainant
has not complied with the general requirement of exhausting domestic remedies prior
to seeking international redress when those domestic avenues proved to be ineffective
or "dead ends". According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a
remedy is ineffective where the procedure fails to incorporate due process rights for
the individual.44 The Council called for due process rights in line with those raised by
the appellant and a standard of judicial review based on "correctness". The Council
suggested that a "fair process capable of providing an effective remedy can be
accomplished within the present structure of the Act."45
Another important argument raised by the Council addressed the relevance of citizen-
ship "status" in the determination of human rights entitlements. This issue was key to
Ms. Baker, who had no "status" in Canada. From a children's rights perspective, this
argument has important implications for future cases as not all children of potential
deportees will be Canadian-born. The Council submitted that the relevant context for
ascertaining human rights in this case is an international one, in which all persons,
regardless of country of origin, have access to basic human rights protections. The
scope or parameters of a right may be delineated by status, but fundamental rights
entitlements should not be based on status as such an approach would be inherently
discriminatory.4 6 The Council also raised concerns regarding the broadened "contex-
tual approach" to rights in the immigration context that the Court had accepted in
Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).4 7 The Council argued
43. Baker, ibid. (Factum of the Canadian Council of Churches at para. 10).
44. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case (Honduras) (1988), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, Annual Report of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 1988, OEA/Ser.L/V/III.19/doc.13 (1988) 35. See also
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Advisory Opinion OC-1 1/90 (1990).
45. Baker, supra note 10 (Factum of the Canadian Council of Churches at para. 24).
46. In this regard the Council cited General Comment 15 on the position of aliens, issued by the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, that requires each State Party ensure the rights in the ICCPR to "all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." See Human Rights Committee, General
Comments Adopted Under Article 40(4) of the ICCPR, GC No. 15, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1, May 19,
1989, at 17, para.l.
47. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 at 732-733, 90 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 135 N.R. 161 [hereinafter Chiarelli cited to
S.C.R.]. In Chiarelli the Court reaffirmed that the Charter is to be interpreted in light of the context
in which it arises. The Court indicated that the context for a non-citizen requires looking to the
principles and policies underlying immigration law, the most fundamental being that "non-citizens
do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country. At common law an alien has no
right to enter or remain in the country ... (at 733)." This reasoning has been followed in a series of
immigration cases to further impede the ability of refugee claimants, permanent residents and other
non-citizens to invoke Charter protection. It deserves mention that the notion advanced by Sopinka
J. in Chiarelli is sharply contested. Historically, the English common law with regard to 'aliens'
reflected the interplay of two competing principles, that of sovereignty and that of freedom of
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against the extension of the contextual approach used in section 1 Charter analysis to
an assessment of the content of the rights themselves. For the Council, if the existence
of a right is determined in part by a person's status, discriminatory standards of
protection are implicitly sanctioned. As the Council postulated, the Court would be
promoting a " ... 'legal apartheid' whereby Canada's human rights protections are
applied in such a manner as to confine non-citizens to a legal space inferior to that
enjoyed by citizens."4 8
In response to the arguments raised by the appellant and the three intervenors, counsel
for the respondent Minister of Citizenship and Immigration outlined six broad con-
tentions. It was asserted that the standard of review for a discretionary decision of an
immigration officer pursuant to subsection 114(2) of the Act was not "correctness",
but whether the officer made an error of principle in the exercise of discretion or
exercised his discretion capriciously or vexatiously. The immigration officer, accord-
ing to the respondent, had complied with the principles of fairness given that the Ms.
Baker had an opportunity to present her case through counsel, submissions and
supporting letters. Fairness required neither an interview nor reasons for decision. The
respondent further suggested that the Convention did not apply because it had not been
adopted in Canadian law. Even if the Convention did apply, it was submitted that it
was not violated because any interference with the children's family was not arbitrary
or unlawful. The respondent adopted the reasoning of Strayer J.A. that a proceeding
relating to a parent's deportation and application to remain in Canada on humanitarian
and compassionate grounds was not a proceeding "concerning" children within the
meaning of Article 3(1) of the Convention, but rather was, at most, a proceeding
"affecting" the children. Accordingly, the best interests of the child need not be a
movement. The Magna Carta of 1215, for example, included permissive provisions aimed at protect-
ing the right of foreign merchants "to go and come out of England, and to stay in and travel through
England by land and water ... in accordance with ancient and just customs". See A.E.D. Howard,
Magna Carta: Text and Commentary (Charlotteville: University Press of Virginia, 1964) at 44;
Coke, 2 Inst. 57, as cited in Dummett & Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1990) at 24-25, 29, 32. In Baker, the Council was attempting to persuade
the Court to clarify its reasoning in Chiarelli and reassert Charter protection for non-citizens.
48. Baker, supra note 10 (Factum of the Canadian Council of Churches) at paras. 40-49. This is of
particular concern where children's rights are at issue. The tendency to either minimize the existence
of rights for minors or to argue that one is "protecting" children by denying them rights is not
uncommon. See e.g. Mohamed v. Toronto (Municipality of Metropolitan) (1996), 133 D.L.R. (4th)
108, 89 O.A.C. 339, online: QL (OJ) (Div. Ct.), in which the Court upheld a decision of Ontario's
Social Assistance Review Board that provincial legislation prohibiting children under the age of 16
from obtaining welfare violated s. 15 of the Charter but was justified under s. I in view of the
important objectives of ensuring proper provision for all children including the receipt of support
from an appropriate source, protecting the integrity of the family unit and not encouraging run-away
children. In a similar vein, the Minister's representatives have argued that the continued detention of
minor refugee claimants from Fujian province, China is justified based on the need to "protect" the
children from kidnapping by the traffickers that brought them to Canada. These arguments have
prevailed despite the fact that immigration detention is authorized under s. 103(3)(b) of the Immigra-
tion Act in only two circumstances, where there is evidence that the person is likely to pose a danger
to the public and where the person is not likely to appear for an examination, inquiry or removal
(supra note 13).
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primary consideration in the proceeding. With regard to the application of the doctrine
of legitimate expectation, the respondent asserted that Canada's ratification of the
CRC did not require immigration officers to give more weight to the best interests of
children when considering whether to exempt their parents from the requirements of
the Immigration Act.49
As for the role of the Charter, the respondent asserted that it did not confer on the
parents of Canadian-born children a right to remain in Canada or an immunity from
deportation. The Charter was not engaged in the private decision of a family as to
whether a Canadian child should accompany a departing parent. In the alternative, the
respondent argued that, if the Charter did apply, no Charter rights were infringed. In
this regard the respondent canvassed a selective group of decisions from the Human
Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights in support of the
submission that fundamental justice in the context of deportation proceedings only
required an evaluation and balancing of all relevant factors. The existence of Canadian
children was just one factor that did not outweigh all of the other factors militating in
favour of a negative decision, namely the appellant's mental illness and dependence
on welfare as well as the government's "compelling interest" in ensuring compliance
with the Immigration Act and discouraging abuse by others.50 In oral argument before
the Court the latter issue was characterized as a matter of the nation's fundamental,
sovereign right to implement a policy of immigration control. Finally it was asserted
that the government was not in breach of its international obligations to provide
effective remedies to litigants domestically. The respondent emphasized that "lack of
success does not mean that a remedy is ineffective" and that effective domestic
remedies included the availability of judicial review with the opportunity to apply for
a stay of execution of a deportation order by the Federal Court, together with the
availability of recourse to provincial superior courts for Charter remedies. 5 1
49. Baker, supra note 10 (Respondent's factum at paras. 21, 22, 24-26,43, 56, 66-79, 91-94).
50. Ibid. at paras. 98, 111-114. The respondent cited Stewart v. Canada (Human Rights Committee,
Comm. No.538/1993, 8 November 1996) para. 12.10; Canepa v. Canada (Human Rights Commit-
tee, Comm. No. 558/1993, 3 April 1997) at paras. 11.5, 11.6; Ahmut v. the Netherlands (1996), Eur.
Ct. H.R. No. 73/1995/579/665; Dalia v. France (1998), Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 154/1996/773/974. Both
the appellant and the intervenors relied on an extensive list of cases as well as academic commentary
to demonstrate support for the principle that maintaining the integrity of a family unit can prevail
over a state interest in expulsion in a variety of immigration situations. See e.g. Berrehab v. Nether-
lands (1988), Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 3/1987/126/177; Djeroud v. France (1991), Eur. Ct. H.R. No.
34/1990/225/289; Mostaquim v. Belgium (1991), Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 31/1989/191/291; Beljoudi v.
France (1992), Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 55/1990/246; Nasri v. France (1995), 21 E.H.R.R. 458. See also
N. Mole, "Constructive Deportation and the European Convention" (1995), Launch Issue E.H.R.L.R.
63; G. Wolf, "Preserving Family Unity: The Rights of Children to Maintain the Companionship of
their Parent and Remain in their Country of Birth" (1996) 4 Global Legal Studies 207; E.F. Abram,
"The Child's Right to Family Unity in International Immigration Law (1995) 17 L. & Pol'y 397; G.
Van Buren, "Protecting Children's Rights in Europe-A Test Case Strategy" (1996) 2 E.H.R.L.R.
171; D. Feldman, "The Developing Scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights" (1997) 3 E.H.R.L.R. 265.
51. Baker, ibid. (Respondent 'sfactum in Response to Intervenors Facta at paras. 11, 15).
Baker v. Canada and the Rights of Children
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
All seven Supreme Court justices who heard the case were unanimous in granting Ms.
Baker's appeal, with the result that the matter was returned to the Minister for
redetermination by a different immigration officer. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. wrote the
majority decision of the Court, on behalf of Gonthier, McLachlin, Bastarache and
Binnie JJ. A separate concurring opinion was written by Iacobucci J., on behalf of
Cory J.
In a recent review of the case, David Mullan notes that "the number of important legal
issues the Court confronts in the judgment clearly far exceeds the norm in judicial
review proceedings."52 Indeed the judgment contains pronouncements on many of the
issues raised by the parties, including the appropriate standard of review for discre-
tionary decisions, the application of the principles of procedural fairness, the reach of
the doctrine of legitimate expectation and the relevance of ratified but unincorporated
treaties. However, the judgment did not address the substantive constitutional argu-
ments advanced by the appellant and intervenors, as it was held that it was possible
to resolve the appeal on the basis of principles of administrative law. 53 The judgment
also failed to consider any of the concerns raised by the Canadian Council of Churches
with regard to the need to revisit the Chiarelli decision and the extent to which the H
& C process did not meet international standards as an effective legal remedy.
The Court was unanimously of the opinion that, in disposing of the appeal, neither it
nor the Federal Court of Appeal were limited in their review to the question that had
been certified by the Federal Court - Trial Decision. Rather, certification of a question
is simply the mechanism which allows for an appeal from a judgment of the Trial
Division, which would not otherwise be permitted. Once a question has been certified,
an appeal court is free to consider all aspects of the decision under review.54
With regard to procedural fairness, the Court dealt with three sub-issues: whether the
participatory rights accorded to both the appellant and her children were consistent
with the duty of fairness; whether the failure to provide reasons was consistent with
the common law duty of fairness; and, whether there was a reasonable apprehension
of bias. L'Heureux-Dub6 J., writing for the majority, granted the appeal on the ground
that there was a denial of the duty of procedural fairness and on the ground that the
exercise of discretion by the decision-maker was unreasonable. First, it was held that
there was a violation of procedural fairness in the sense that the written reasons of the
decision-maker created a reasonable apprehension of bias. 55 In reaching this decision,
it was held that statutory and prerogative decision-makers had a duty to provide
reasons, but that this duty should be interpreted flexibly. In the circumstances of the
decision challenged in Baker, the reasons contained in the subordinate officer's notes
were adequate reasons. 56 Although the Court held that H & C applicants were entitled
52. See D. Mullan, supra note 14 at 146.
53. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 11.
54. Ibid. at para. 12.
55. Ibid. at paras. 45-48.
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to more than the Shah standard of minimal fairness, "it cannot be said that an oral
hearing is always necessary to ensure a fair hearing and consideration of the issues
involved." 57 The opportunity that was accorded to Ms. Baker to submit full written
documentation regarding her situation and the situation of her children satisfied the
requirements of the participatory rights required by the duty of fairness .58
Second, in dealing with the issue of whether the decision-maker's exercise of discre-
tion was reasonable, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. held that by failing to seriously consider the
interests of the appellant's four Canadian-born children, the decision-maker had
exercised his discretion in an unreasonable manner. It was in reaching this conclusion
that the majority decision considered the importance of children's rights and best
interests, as set out in the Convention and other international law instruments which
have been ratified by Canada. The relevant articles of the CRC, cited by the Court
were articles 3, 9 and 12. The Court did not refer to article 10 which deals with family
reunification or article 2 which prohibits discrimination on any grounds including the
status of the parent. The majority held that a contextual approach was required to
determine whether the officer's decision was consistent with the requirements of the
statute and the values of administrative law. These international legal instruments were
held to constitute an important part of the context within which the phrase, "compas-
sionate or humanitarian considerations", is used in the Act and Regulations. Other
indications of the importance of children's rights and best interests to society's
humanitarian and compassionate values could be found in the preamble of the Act,
which includes the objective of facilitating family reunification, and in the immigra-
tion guidelines, which emphasize that officers making decisions should consider
hardship on applicants' families in exercising their discretion. 59
Iacobucci J., in his concurring judgment, agreed with the majority's disposition of the
appeal as well as its reasoning, except with respect to the effect of international law
on the Minister's exercise of humanitarian and compassionate discretion. He held that
the Convention has never been implemented through legislation and therefore is of no
force or effect within the Canadian legal system. By making reference to the values
underlying an unimplemented treaty in the course of a contextual analysis to statutory
interpretation and administrative law, he held that the majority had allowed the
appellant to achieve indirectly what she could not achieve directly. In other words, it
indirectly gave force and effect in domestic Canadian law to an international treaty
that had not been implemented. 60
56. Ibid. at paras. 35-44.
57. Ibid. at para. 33.
58. Ibid. at paras. 30-34.
59. Ibid. at paras. 49-75.
60. Ibid. at paras.78-81.
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IV. COMMENTARY ON THE COURT'S DECISION
Children's rights issues were at the core of the stated question before the Supreme
Court of Canada. Yet children's rights assumed a subordinate role in the Court's
judgment. Ms. Baker's H & C application, reconsidered after the Supreme Court's
ruling, has received "approval in principle". Thus, in concrete terms the decision was
a victory for Ms. Baker and her children. 61 The judgment also has positive
implications for all children embroiled in immigration cases and other administrative
matters. Both the positive and problematic dimensions of the judgment in terms of
children's rights will be discussed in the following commentary.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court adopted a contextual approach to reviewing the duty
of fairness and assessing the reasonableness of the immigration officer's decision and
did not engage with Charter or statutory interpretation issues per se. The reluctance
to directly apply the Charter, even as an interpretive tool, is consistent with the Court's
recent tendency of narrowing the application of the Charter in immigration cases. A
recent example of this trend is the 1992 decision of Chiarelli.62 In Chiarelli, at issue
was the constitutionality of the statutory scheme providing for the deportation of a
permanent resident on conviction of a serious criminal offence. Writing on behalf of
a unanimous Court, Sopinka J. expressly integrated a common law principle that
"non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country" into
Charter standards, rather than ensuring that the common law standard measure up to
the Charter standard.63 In Baker, the Court chose to frame the case narrowly in its
immigration context rather than investigating its wider ramifications in terms of
children's rights. Even the references to the Convention and international human rights
law generally, were relegated to an analysis of the reasonableness of the decision under
review and did not inform the Court's reasoning on the scope or content of procedural
fairness. It should be noted in this regard that the regulatory framework of the
immigration program offers considerable discretion to decision-makers and proce-
dural rights frequently give way to deference and administrative efficiency. The
Court's recourse to the immigration scheme as the primary context, as opposed to a
childrens' rights or Charter rights framework, was a profoundly limiting device that
served to restrict the judgment's potential impact on the structures of administrative
decision making within the Immigration Department. In contrast to the radical over-
haul of refugee status determination procedures required by the Court pursuant to its
decision in Singh in 1985,64 the omission of Charter issues in the consideration of the
61. At the time of writing this paper, the authors learned that Ms. Baker's application was approved but
that she has not been landed.
62. Chiarelli, supra note 47.
63. Ibid. at 733, 731-734. For a discussion of this case as well as this trend more generally, see F.P.
Eliadis, "The Swing from Singh: The Narrowing Application of the Charter in Immigration Law"
(1993) 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130. Similar observations have been made in the British context. See S.
Sterett, "Narrowing it Down: Immigration Practices" in Creating Constitutionalism? The Politics of
Legal Expertise and Administrative Law in England and Wales (Ann Arbor The University of
Michigan Press, 1997) at 151-182.
64. Supra note 19.
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Baker case effectively ensured that the government would not be required to make
any fundamental changes to the institutional practices and procedures related to H &
C decision making.
Procedural Fairness and Participatory Rights
An important part of the Court's analysis in Baker was the nature of the decision in
question. This is always a central issue in determining what is required by the common
law duty of procedural fairness in a given set of circumstances. The Court held that a
humanitarian and compassionate determination is "an important decision that affects
in a fundamental manner the future of individuals' lives." Contrary to the submissions
of the government and the ruling of the Federal Court of Appeal that a deportation
proceeding and an application to remain in Canada on H & C grounds did not
"concern" the children, the Court reached the obvious conclusion that such proceed-
ings "... may also have an important impact on the lives of any Canadian children of
the person since they may be separated from one of their parents and/or uprooted from
their country of citizenship, where they have settled and have connections.
'65
While the Court recognized the significance of the determination for children, it did
not consider the question of procedural fairness through the lens of human rights,
Charter rights or international law. By way of contrast, it is interesting to note the
Court's recent decisions in L.L.A. v. A.B. 66 and R. v. O'Connor.67 In these cases, the
Court considered the rights of witnesses in criminal proceedings who were not direct
parties. The Court examined the privacy interests at stake from the standpoint of the
common law and the Charter and arrived at a process, standing and the right to appeal,
which was based on the principles of natural justice and section 7 of the Charter. Like
the children in Baker, witnesses in criminal proceedings are considered "third parties"
to the main proceeding. Yet witnesses have been afforded considerable participatory
rights on the basis of an interest in the outcome of a legal process which may have
significant importance to them but is unlikely to be as fundamental as'a proceeding in
which children face the prospect of separation from their parents. Had the Court in
Baker employed a similar approach to the "third party" interests of the Baker children,
utilizing the Charter itself as part of the context, a higher standard of procedural
fairness might have been exacted.
The Court examined the nature and extent of the children's right to participate in an
H & C process involving their parent with reference to the duty of procedural fairness.
The Court emphasized that the purpose of the duty of procedural fairness was "to
ensure that the administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure,
appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social
context, with an opportunity for those affected by the decision to put forward their
views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker."
68
65. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 15.
66. [1995] 4 S.C.R. 537, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 422, 190 N.R. 329 [hereinafter LLA.].
67. [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235, 191 N.R. 1 [hereinafter O'Connor].
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The Court considered the issue of the legitimate expectation doctrine as a facet of
determining the content of the duty of procedural fairness. In addressing this aspect
of the case, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. did not discuss the applicability of the reasoning in
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh,69 a decision of the High
Court of Australia that had been relied upon by the appellant and expressly rejected
by the lower courts. Mr. Teoh was a Malaysian citizen with temporary status in
Australia. He was refused resident status and ordered deported because of a criminal
record. The Australian High Court found that the decision maker had failed to make
the best interests of Mr. Teoh's children a primary consideration consistent with the
terms of article 3 of the Convention. The Court reasoned that ratification of a treaty
gave rise to a legitimate expectation, in the absence of statutory or executive indica-
tions -to the contrary, that decision-makers would act in conformity with the treaty. At
the same time, the Court reaffirmed the principle that unincorporated treaties do not
create legally enforceable rights. In concrete terms, the Court held that procedural
fairness required that an individual subjected to deprivation of the protection afforded
68. Baker, supra note 10.
69. (1995), 69 A.L.J.R. 423, 183 C.L.R. 283 (Austr. H.C.) [hereinafter Teoh]. In support of its argument
that the reasoning in Teoh should not be applied in Baker, the respondent cited the Australian
government's immediate release of a press statement purporting to restrict the scope of the case:
"...the act of entering a treaty does not give rise to legitimate expectations in administrative law
which could form the basis of challenging an administrative decision" [Joint Statement by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice, 25 February 1997,
online: Australasian Legal Information Institute Homepage <http:/www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-birdisp.pl/au/
other/ahricAnnouncemnets/joint statement.htm>]. The respondent also made reference to pending
legislation, the Administrative Decisions (Effect of International Instruments) Bill of 1997, which
sought to reinforce the Australian government's position that Teoh was "not consistent with the
proper role of parliament in implementing treaties in Australian law" (ibid (Respondent's factum 45
at para. 84). Indeed after the release of the Teoh decision, a number of Australian judges attempted to
narrow the application of the ruling or at least distinguish it. See e.g. Brown v. Brown (9 April 1996),
SA 82 of 1995, ML6570 of 1994 (Faro. Ct.). By the end of 1998, however, after the hearing in
Baker, the Australian government had adopted a policy guideline in the form of a Ministerial
Direction (21 December 1998, at para. 16) clarifying that "the decision maker must determine the
best interests of any children aged less than 18 years who are in a parent-child or other close
relationship with the potential deportee." Subsequent decisions of the Australian Federal Court have
followed Teoh, finding that it is an error of law if notice is not provided of a deliberate decision not
to act in conformity with the Convention. See Hui v. Minister of Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs, [1999] FCA 985 21 July 1999; Kwong Leung Lam v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultu-
ral Affairs, [1998] FCA 154 (4 March 1998); Tevita Musie Vaitaiki v. Minister for Immigration &
Ethnic Affairs, [1998] 5 FCA (15 January 1998). More recently, the Australian Administrative
Appeals Tribunal considered the effect of the Ministerial Direction and held that "the General
Direction incorporates Australia's obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child"
(Durietz & Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999), AATA01 1 (21 December
1999). For a discussion of Teoh in its Australian context, see J. Chen, "Taking International Obliga-
tions More Seriously" (Address to 50 th Anniversary Conference, Australasian Law Teachers' Asso-
ciation, Cross-Currents: Internationalism, National Identity and the Law, 1995); A. Nicholson, Chief
Justice of the Family Court of Australia, "Advancing Children's Rights and Interests: The Need for
Better Inter-Governmental Collaboration" (The 1996 Sir Ronald Wilson Lecture, 13 November
1996, Perth, Western Australia).
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by the Convention was entitled to notice and an opportunity to present their case in a
hearing.
In Baker, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. found that the articles of the CRC did not give rise to a
legitimate expectation that certain procedural rights would be afforded to the appellant
(or, presumably, her children). The Court specifically stated that the CRC did not
amount to a promise by the government that a humanitarian review would be con-
ducted in a particular manner, nor did it guarantee more fulsome participatory rights. 70
However, as noted by Lorne Sossin, the Court "left the door somewhat ajar" 7 1 by
observing that "It is unnecessary to decide whether an international instrument ratified
by Canada could, in other circumstances, give rise to a legitimate expectation." 72 In
some respects this is a positive signal of the Court's willingness to include treaty
ratification as a relevant factor in future deliberations on procedural fairness, but the
Court has provided no indication as to what circumstances might persuade it to do so.
In this sense the Court may have clarified the scope of the doctrine of legitimate
expectation generally but it has provided very little guidance as to how treaty
ratification might be framed as a constituent element of anyone's expectations.
In considering whether notice and an oral hearing were required, the Court referred
to the exceptional importance to the lives of those with an interest in its result: the
claimant and his or her close family members. When weighed with other factors, this
enhanced the content of the duty of fairness, making it a more exacting duty. However,
despite the Court's explicit rejection of the Shah standard of "minimal fairness", 73 the
Court refused to meaningfully extend participatory rights in the H & C process.
Applicants and their children were entitled to an opportunity to present their case and
to have it fully and fairly considered", 74 but in the eyes of the Court, this standard was
satisfied by written materials put forward through counsel concerning Ms. Baker, her
children and their emotional dependence on her. Thus, the Court concluded, the denial
of notice and an oral hearing to the children did not violate the duty of fairness. It
deserves mention, however, that the Court did not say that there was never any
entitlement to an oral hearing. As David Mullan has observed, the ruling in support of
the adequacy of a paper review is "firmly rooted in the circumstances 'of this case',"75
leaving open the possibility that an oral hearing may be necessary in at least some
instances.76 Mullan appropriately queries: "What might those instances be? Would
they include most, if not all situations that typically trigger claims to an in-person
hearing in other contexts, namely where there is a concern with credibility?" 77 It could
70. Ibid. at para. 29.
71. Sossin, supra note 14, text accompanying note 81.
72. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 29.
73. Shah, supra note 20.
74. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 32.
75. Ibid. at para. 34.
76. Mullan, supra note 14 at 150.
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be argued that the Court placed some reliance on the fact that Ms. Baker had legal
representation, given a specific reference to her lawyer in this section of the judgment.
Many H & C applicants, if not the majority, are unrepresented. Considered a purely
administrative matter, few legal aid plans across Canada fund these applications. The
Court's reasoning gives rise to the possibility of an applicant, particularly a child,
advancing an argument that their lack of legal representation, places them on a
different and more disadvantaged footing than Ms. Baker and is sufficient to justify
an in - person interview.78
It is clear, however, that the Court's judgment falls far short of the "due process"
requirements of Article 12 of the Convention, the benchmark of children's participa-
tory rights. Indeed, the CRC is completely ignored in this portion of the Court's
analysis with disappointing results. On the facts of the Baker case, the indirect
presentation of the material in writing by the children's mother was seen to be
sufficient even in the face of the children wishing to meet with the immigration officer
directly. It would appear that the Courts focus on the adequacy of a paper review
conflated this issue with the consideration of direct written presentations by children.
Presumably, a child who wished to file independent written testimony of his or her
views (and best interests), would be permitted to do so. However, this can only be
inferred as a logical assumption from the Court's reasoning; it is not an articulated
right. As a practical matter, without receiving notice of the proceeding or a mechanism
to facilitate access to legal counsel, children are afforded little opportunity for
meaningful input into a process in which their interests are to be considered as an
important factor in the determination.
Administrative law principles have justified lower procedural safeguards in the
context of discretionary decision making where, as here, the applicant is not seeking
to enforce a right or entitlement, but rather a discretionary exemption from a statutory
requirement. In effect, there has been a two-tier approach to procedural requirements
based on the distinctions drawn between rights versus privileges or discretionary
benefits.79 However, apart from recourse to the provincial superior courts, which will
be discussed in the latter part of this paper, the H & C process is the primary remedy
for children with fundamental rights at stake in the deportation of their parent. The
government represents the H & C process as an effective remedy for addressing the
human rights entitlements for persons who may have fallen through the cracks in the
immigration scheme, 80 but has afforded no mechanism for children to meaningfully
77. Ibid.
78. In Ontario, the community legal clinic system frequently fills the gaps in coverage on the part of the
judicare side of the legal aid plan. A number of the Toronto based legal clinics provide assistance to
H & C applicants. However the service is not uniformly provided and based on the geographic
"catchment areas" of the clinics, an applicant may find that the only clinic that she is entitled to
receive service from does not provide immigration related assistance. Interview with G. Sadoway,
Immigration Division, Parkdale Community Legal Services, 14 March 2000.
79. See D. Galloway, Immigration Law (Concord, On.: Irwin Law, 1997) at 87-91 for a discussion of
this two-tiered approach to procedural fairness in the context of immigration law.
80. Note that this view was offered in an oral statement by counsel for the Minister in response to a
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participate in the process. It should be remembered in this regard that resident or
citizen children are not permitted to apply for H & C consideration in their own right.
If these children are not satisfied with an H & C decision, they have no direct right to
seek judicial review or even obtain standing in judicial review proceedings initiated
by their parent. 81 As for non-citizen children, the Act treats them as mere dependants
of the primary applicant - parent and, according to the ruling in Baker, the Court would
presume that their interests would be adequately represented by their parent. The Court
failed to embrace an important opportunity to enhance the participatory rights of
children in Baker, within the existing statutory scheme of the Immigration Act, to
ensure that public procedures were consistent with Canada's domestic and interna-
tional human rights obligations.
A further concern under the rubric of procedural fairness relates to the question of
whether the wishes of the child constitute a component of the best interests standard.
The Supreme Court's prior decision in Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education may
provide some assistance in this regard. 82 In that case the Court stated unequivocally
that, for older children who are capable of communicating, their views and wishes will
"play an important role" in the determination of what is in their best interests. Future
litigants will have to address the inevitable distinction that may be drawn between
procedural rights afforded in the context of a dispute concerning access to a basic
entitlement such as public education and those afforded in more discretionary matters
such as an H & C application. Nevertheless, the Eaton case may prove to be the means
of addressing some of the ambiguities and unresolved issues relating to participatory
rights arising out of the Baker decision.
Procedural Fairness and Reasons/Bias
Through its ruling in Baker, the Court implicitly rejected a previous decision of the
Federal Court of Appeal that the common law duty of fairness did not oblige admin-
general petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Canadian Council for
Churches. v. Canada in October 1996. In its response to the Commission's draft report based on an
on-site visit to Canada made the following year and triggered by the general petition, the government
obliquely addressed the relationship between international guarantees and domestic law, asserting
that, "Canada implements the relevant parts of the American Declaration and the Covenant
using the standards and procedures set out in the Immigration Act and the general legal system
in Canada." (see infra note 155 at para. 36) Canada's Third Report to the U.N. Committee
against Torture (25 October 1999) at para. 50, also cites the H & C process in its catalogue of
remedies for failed refugee claimants. In Baker, the Respondent stated that "the place for the
interests of the family unit to be taken into account" is in the H & C process (supra note 10
(Respondent's factum at para. 109)).
81. Supra note 9. See also Yanichevski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] F.C.J.
No. 1805, online: QL (FCJ), in which a motion brought by the Canadian daughter of parents who
were about to be deported was dismissed. In its reasons, the Court indicated that it was bound by the
decision in Langner and thus the daughter had no right under the Charter to remain with her parents
(Langner, supra note 9).
82. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 at 277-78, 142 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 207 N.R. 171 [hereinafter Eaton]. In this case
the Court held that the best interests of the child principle should be the focus for school board
officials in determining the educational needs of a severely disabled child.
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istrative decision-makers to provide reasons for discretionary decisions. In Williams
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),83 the Federal Court of Appeal
had dismissed the argument that the Minister had a duty to provide reasons for a
decision to declare a permanent resident who had been in Canada since he was ten
years old a "danger to the public" and thereby subject him to deportation. In Baker,
L'Heureux-Dub J. recognized that the "profound importance of an H & C decision
to those affected ... militates in favour of a requirement that reasons be provided. It
would be unfair for a person subject to a decision such as this one which is so critical
to their future not to be told why the result was reached."' 84 Her subsequent conclusion
that the notes of the first level immigration officer were sufficient to constitute reasons,
however, set a very low standard in terms of the quality of reasons to be provided. As
pointed out by Lorne Sossin, it also implicitly legitimates the delegation of reasons
preparation to the first level officer rather then the decision-making officer, a practice
that appears to run counter to the common law presumption against delegation of
fairness related obligations. 85 Further, this dimension of the judgment could serve as
a basis in subsequent cases to effectively immunize the Department from judicial
review. Indeed in two post-Baker cases, the Federal Court appeared willing to accept
as sufficient "reasons" a pre-prepared form modified subsequent to an interview to fit
the facts of the application, and in another case, the ticking of the "denied" box on a
form.86 On the other hand, from the standpoint of the Baker children, the Court's
finding was positive as it brought the reasons of the subordinate officer within the
scope of judicial review and, thus, under scrutiny. As Brown and Evans suggest, this
provided the Court with an opportunity to elaborate on the reasonable apprehension
of bias doctrine in cases involving vulnerable persons or "those who belong to groups
that have been marginalized or made the subject of discrimination".
8 7
In reviewing the tone and content of the reasons, the Court found that the well-
informed member of the community" would perceive bias when reading the line
officer's comments. His notes ... do not disclose the existence of an open mind,"
88
and made several unfounded connections, including a link between "the fact that she
had several children, and the conclusion that she would therefore be a strain on the
83. [1997] 2 F.C. 646 (C.A), leave to appeal to'S.C.C. refused [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 332 (QL) (October
16, 1997). Pursuant to s. 70 (5) of the Act, permanent residents have no right to appeal a deportation
order where the Minister certifies that they constitute a "danger to the public" and they have
committed a serious crime as defined in the legislation (supra note 13). Public danger certification is
a paper procedure in which the person concerned is afforded minimal rights of due process. Williams
was an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the fairness of the procedures.
84. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 43.
85. Sossin, supra note 14, text accompanying footnote 87. See also J.L.H. Sprague, "Another View of
Baker" (1999) 7 R.A.L. 163 at 165.
86. See Xu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1184 (T.D.); Liang v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1301 (T.D.), as discussed in
Sossin, ibid., text accompanying footnote 89.
87. Brown & Evans, supra note 14 at 5.
88. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 48.
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social welfare system for the rest of her life." 89 The Court speculated that, to an
objective viewer, the officer might have based his decision on the fact that Ms. Baker
was a single mother with several children who had been diagnosed with a psychiatric
illness. In applying the standards for reasonable apprehension of bias to the circum-
stances in the Baker case, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. noted that these standards may vary,
like other aspects of procedural fairness, depending on the context and the type of
function performed by the administrative decision maker involved." 90 The context
here, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. observed, was one which required special sensitivity. She
continued:
Canada is a nation largely made up of people whose families migrated here in
recent centuries. Our history is one that shows the importance of immigration, and
our society shows the benefits of having a diversity of people whose origins are in a
multitude of places around the world. Because they necessarily relate to people of
diverse backgrounds, from different cultures, races, and continents, immigration
decisions demand sensitivity and understanding by those who make them. They
require a recognition of diversity, an understanding of others, and an openness to
difference. 9 1
In rendering this decision, the Supreme Court made a clear statement, although without
reference to any human rights instruments, that discriminatory decision-making will
not be tolerated. Children should not be viewed as a reason for devaluing the status
of a woman, nor should single-parenthood. Somewhat striking in this aspect of the
judgment, however, is the absence of any explicit reference to the social reality of
racism and the extent to which Ms. Baker and her children were victims of racism -
on the part of the individual officer as well as in a wider system which continues to
operate on exclusionary principles, despite the formal eradication of racist selection
criteria from the Act.92 As Carol Aylward has observed, "[lI]aw in all its manifestations
- in substance...in procedure and in interpretation - has been and continues to be an
instrument that contributes to and maintains racial inequalities, divisions and ten-
sions..." in Canada. 93 The facts presented to the Court in Baker provided an ideal
context to conceptualize racism as a defining feature of the bias manifested in the case
and to offer a more pointed rejection of decisions tainted by racism. The judgment's
failure to articulate racism - and its intersection with the other stereotypes attributed
to the Baker family (concerning gender, number of children, economic and mental
health status) - as the source of the bias may have been a function of the way the
arguments were framed by the litigants themselves. In any event, as racism was swept
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid. at para. 47.
91. Ibid.
92. See A. Simmons, "Racism and Immigration Policy" in V. Satzewitch ed., Racism and Social Equal-
ity in Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1998) at 91; S. Aiken, "Racism and
Canadian Refugee Policy" (1999) 18:4 Refuge 2.
93. C. Aylward, Canadian Critical Race Theory (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999) at 15-16.
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under the proverbial judicial rug, the Court refused to confront a critical problem that
continues to disadvantage H & C applicants and their children at the first instance.
Reasonable Exercise of Discretion
Although the case could have been disposed of on the issue of bias, the Court chose
to examine the issue of the reasonableness of the decision, taking into account the
certified question, namely, the relevance of the best interests of the child to the
determination. In identifying the appropriate standard for judicial review of an exercise
of administrative discretion, the Court adopted the "pragmatic and functional
approach" articulated most recently in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizen-
ship and Immigration),94 which recognizes that standards of review for errors of law
are seen as a spectrum, with certain decisions being entitled to more deference and
others to less.95 The Court looked to the powers conferred by the legislation, the factual
nature of the inquiry, its role within the statutory scheme as an exception, the expertise
of the Minister as the formal decision-maker and the considerable discretion vested
in the immigration officer. The Court balanced these factors against the absence of a
privative clause, the existence of judicial review and the individual, rather than
polycentric, nature of the decision to conclude that the standard of review was one of
"reasonableness simpliciter", as opposed to the more deferential "patent unreasonable-
ness" standard or the least deferential "correctness" standard.
The core issue in determining whether or not the decision was reasonable was the
approach taken to the interests of the children. The Court found that the approach taken
failed the reasonableness test as articulated in Canada (Director of Investigation and
Research) v. Southam,96 namely,
An unreasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not supported by any reasons
that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination. Accordingly, a court review-
ing a conclusion on the reasonableness standard must look to see whether any
reasons support it. The defect, if there is one, could presumably be in the eviden-
tiary foundation itself or in the logical process by which conclusions are sought to
be drawn from it.97
The Court commented on the immigration officer's dismissive approach to the
childrens interests and his failure to give serious weight and consideration to the
interests of the children. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. found that the reasons were "inconsistent
with the values underlying the grant of the discretion" and as such, they could not
"stand up to the somewhat probing examination required". 98
94. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982,226 N.R. 201,43 Imm. L.R. (2d) 117, as am. by [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1222.
95. See H. Krever, "Judicial Review" (Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, New Feder-
ally Appointed Judges Seminar, Chateau Mont Tremblant, Mont-Tremblant, Qc., 27 February - 5
March, 1999) at 5-22 for an excellent review of the broader administrative law jurisprudence on the
standard of review.
96. [ 1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, 144 D.L.R. (4th) 1,209 N.R. 20 [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].
97. Ibid. at 776-777, as quoted in Baker, supra note 10 at para. 63.
98. Baker, ibid at para. 65.
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As noted previously, the Supreme Court in Baker specifically declined to deal with
the Charter arguments. The Court made only this comment in passing:
... [D]iscretion must still be exercised in a manner that is within the reasonable
interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accor-
dance with the rule of law ... in line with the principles of administrative law
governing the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.99
Since, as the Court acknowledged, it would have to interpret the duty of fairness in a
manner consistent with the Charter, it remains an open question as to whether the
benchmark set out in Baker disposes of the constitutional question or the case is
confined to its facts. With respect to the Charter, it is of the utmost significance that
Iacobucci J., in his concurring judgment, criticized the majority for transporting the
CRC directly into the principles of administrative law but suggested, on the other hand,
that there would be room for a Charter analysis. For future litigants, this may be the
reference that will open the door to a fresh, Charter analysis.
The significant ratio of the decision from a children's rights standpoint is:
In my opinion, a reasonable exercise of the power conferred by the section requires
close attention to the interests and needs of children. Childrens rights, and attention
to their interests, are central humanitarian and compassionate values in Canadian
society. 100
In terms of children's specific interest in maintaining family unity, the Court acknowl-
edged the significance of section 3(c) of the Act, affording a large and liberal
interpretation to its underlying values and thus, "[t]he obligation to take seriously and
place important weight on keeping children in contact with both parents, if possible,
and maintaining connections between close family members..."101 The Court also
cited the Minister's guidelines and concluded that humanitarian values included
".. avoiding hardship by sending people to places where they no longer have connec-
tions."10 2 It is interesting to note, however, that in its consideration of family unity,
the Court omitted any reference to international human rights standards and in
particular, article 9 of the Convention which prohibits the separation of a child from
his or her parent under all circumstances unless "necessary for the best interests of the
child." A "necessity" requirement, as advocated by the Canadian Foundation for
Children, Youth and the Law would have ensured that family unity would always
trump state interests, subject to the best interests of the child. Further, in its judgment,
the Court registered a significant caveat: "... [t]hat is not to say that the children's best
interests must always outweigh other considerations, or that there will not be other
reasons for denying an H & C claim even when the childrens interests are given this
consideration." 10 3 The best interests of children must be treated as an important factor
99. Ibid. at para. 53.
100. Ibid. at para. 67.
101. Ibid at para. 68.
102. Ibid at para. 72.
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and given substantial weight, but they are not determinative - not the primary
consideration, even in cases where separation of the child from his or parents is directly
at issue. Unfortunately this statement by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. sets a much lower
standard than article 9 of the CRC. It also provides very little guidance as to the criteria
relevant for determining whether or not the interests of children have been accorded
adequate weight. Would a more detailed analysis of these interests in a line officer's
notes be sufficient? In what circumstances would countervailing state interests out-
weigh the best interests of children? The judgment leaves these important issues
unresolved and the Court's lack of clarification in this regard is certain to give rise to
further litigation.
Unimplemented Treaties and Domestic Law
The final dimension of the Baker ruling that merits attention concerns the Court's
articulation of the relationship between international human rights law and domestic
law. The Court held that international treaties have no direct application in Canadian
law unless they have been expressly incorporated by statute. 104 Nevertheless, the
presumption of compliance with international law included Canada's legal obligations
under unincorporated treaties. Thus the Court found "the values reflected in interna-
tional law may help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and
judicial review". 105 Such values and principles generally recognized "the importance
of being attentive to the rights and best interests of children when decisions are made
that relate to their future" and the entitlement of children to "special care and
assistance." 106 The Court noted that the important role of international human rights
law as an aid in interpreting domestic law has also been emphasized in other common
law countries", including New Zealand and India. 107 Further, the Court found that
"international human rights law ... is ... a critical influence on the interpretation of
the scope of the rights included in the Charter."108 In this regard the Court adopted
the arguments advanced by the appellant and the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues,
reaffirming and possibly even extending, the principles established in Slaight Com-
munications a decade earlier. Commenting on the significance of the Court's charac-
terization of international human rights law as a "critical influence", Craig Scott
suggests that the judgment embraces a "cosmopolitan conception of the rule of law"
103. Ibid at para. 75.
104. The cases cited in support of this principle were Francis v. R., [1956] S.C.R. 618 at 621; and Capital
Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 at
172-73.
105. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 70. In addition to Slaight Communications, supra note 35, the Court
relied upon R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, and R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of
Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 333.
106. Baker, ibid., at paras. 70-71. In addition to the CRC, the Court made specific reference to the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Rights of the Child
(supra note 9).
107. The Court cited Tavita v. Minister ofImmigration, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.) at 266; and Vishaka
v. Rajasthan, [1997] 3 L.R.C. 361 (S.C.India) at 367.
108. Baker, supra note 10 at para. 70.
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which requires Canadian courts to "show fidelity to the international legal order by
seeking to harmonise domestic law with international law as much as interpretive
space allows." 109 In previous family law judgments, however, the Supreme Court had
referred to the CRC to defend the constitutionality of the "best interests" standard
already present in Canadian law.11 0 In Baker the Court was presented with its first
opportunity to use the CRC in a more direct manner, in an area of domestic law which
did not afford parallel protections. It was an opportunity which the Court did not fully
seize.
Outcome
As noted by Daiva Stasiulus, the Baker decision challenges the Immigration Department's
treatment of migrant domestic workers and their children."'l There is no doubt that
the case has set an important precedent in terms of procedural justice. The Court has
mandated a new approach by immigration officers in H & C applications, an approach
which recognizes the importance and interdependence of the family unit and the
critical impact of separation or relocation on children. Further, the Court has paved
the way for consideration of the best interests of children as a facet of all reasonable,
executive decisions.
The outcome of the Baker decision was fairly clear for the children of Ms. Baker: their
interests had been disregarded and the matter was sent back for a redetermination. For
other children, less clarity exists, but certain limited rights can be safely articulated.
A child whose parent is about to be deported as the result of a negative H & C
determination, now has the following entitlements:
* the right to have their parents present the case for their best interests in writing
* the right to submit their own case in writing
* the right to have their best interests - that is, rights, interests and needs - treated
as an important factor and given substantial weight
In our view it remains somewhat unclear whether these entitlements will translate into
any fundamental advances for the children of foreign-born women. The following
sections of this paper represent our attempt to gauge the impact of the judgment and
109. C. Scott, "Canada's International Human Rights Obligations and Disadvantaged Members of Soci-
ety: Finally into the Spotlight?" (1999) 10 Constitutional Forum 97 at 100. Professor Scott was
counsel for the Charter Committee on Poverty. Issues in the Baker case.
110. See P.(D.) v. S (C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141 at 180; Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 at 76; W.(V.)
v. S.(D.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 108 at 153. In Young v. Young, the Court considered the right of a parent
with visiting rights to expose his children to religious activities. The Court stated: "mhe need to
make the best interests of the child the primary consideration in all actions concerning children,
including legal proceedings, is specifically recognized in ... the Convention on the Rights of the
Child... mhis amply demonstrates both the enduring value of the best interests test as a legal norm
capable of meaningful application and the broad recognition of children in the field of human
rights." [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 at 75 (per L'Heureux-Dubd J. dissenting, but not on this point).
111. D. Stasiulus, "Negotiating the Citizenship Divide" (Paper presented to National Forum on Equality
Rights, West Coast LEAF,Vancouver, B.C., 4-7 November 1999) at 13.
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highlight some of the challenges ahead in terms of children's rights in the realm of
immigration.
V. THE AFTERMATH OF THE DECISION
A great deal of media interest followed the Supreme Court's release of its decision in
the Baker case in July 1999 and much of the commentary was negative. Even Margaret
Wente, in an otherwise sympathetic column in the Globe and Mail, opined that "some
people are worried that the Baker case opens its doors to hordes of passport babies
and their exploitative mothers. Maybe they should worry instead about an immigration
system so clumsy, so inefficient, and so dumb that it can't even catch and deport a
nearly illiterate Jamaican cleaning lady."' 1 2 Wente's description of Ms. Baker was not
only offensive, it belied the same taint of racial and gender bias evident in the
immigration officer's notes that the Supreme Court found so unacceptable. In an
editorial in the same newspaper the following comments were offered,
... We would suggest that the court doesn't know the meaning of the word "bias"
and hasn't done much community polling recently ... Ms. Baker has had a sad life,
but she is the author of many of her misfortunes, beginning with staying here
illegally. But the essential problem with the court's ruling is that it is hard to
imagine any case in which separating a mother and/or father from children will not
have deleterious effects on the children. The logical response to a parental deporta-
tion would be for children to return to their parents' native country.
Nonetheless, if the parents wish their children to stay here because they are Cana-
dian citizens by virtue of birth, so be it. But this country cannot go down a road in
which illegal immigrants think if they have a child here, that translates into a free
passage for themselves into Canada. This will throw into disarray the distinction
between those who choose Canada and those whom Canada chooses.
This country must not permit the immigration process to become the legal equiva-
lent of a shotgun wedding.113
An editorial in the National Post suggested that the Court had "stepped beyond the
aegis of judicial review and into the realm of law making" and further admonished
that
... Canada may have signed the convention, but it has never incorporated into
domestic law. This should have sent a signal to the courts that Ottawa does not wish
for illegal immigrants who bear children on Canadian soil to be thrust to the front of
the immigration queue.
Instead, Parliament deliberately chose to vest immigration officers with considerable
discretion ... Moreover, Parliament never ordered immigration officers to blindly
follow the dictates of international human rights documents when they decide on
cases... 114
112. M. Wente, "On Canada's porous immigration system" The Globe and Mail (13 July 1999) A20.
113. "Having children can't be the path to a passport" The Globe and Mail (12 July 1999) A10.
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Within a few weeks of the Court's decision in Baker, the country's attention was
diverted to the more sensational news of boats arriving off the west coast carrying
passengers from Fujian province, China. Media reports described the migrants as
"bogus refugees" and "queue jumpers" who should be sent back immediately. Once
again Canada's porous borders were a cause for derision and alarm.11 5 The fact that
a number of the migrants have since been recognized as Convention refugees seems
to have done little to stem the tide of negative publicity. Yet the men, women and
children desperate to reach "golden mountain" share a similar trajectory with Mavis
Baker and her children. The media reports extracted above fail to consider that
deteriorating economic conditions, in which Canada is clearly implicated through its
participation in global capitalism, have resulted in massive unemployment and dis-
placement in countries as diverse as Jamaica and China. 116 At the same time, the
Canadian economy thrives on the labour of low wage earning migrants in the shadow
economy. Women like Mavis Baker are employed in the homes of middle and upper
class Canadians and meet a critical demand for live-in care givers and other household
workers. 117 As the government clamours to defend the territorial sovereignty of the
nation, many Fujianese children languish in Canadian jails without access to educa-
tion, and the children of other undocumented workers struggle to survive in the face
of the precarious existence of their parents. Frequently, children are the most vulner-
able victims of a system that treats their parents as "expendable and deportable
labour." 118
In contrast to the media backlash against the decision, the Federal Court has embraced
the ruling and used it to contest the absolute authority of the Immigration Department
in circumstances ranging from the procedures for "public danger" certification, the
issuance of minister's permits, student and immigrant visas overseas as well as
"in-land" humanitarian and compassionate applications. In a series of Trial Division
judgments, the Baker case has been applied to overturn discretionary decisions and
send the matter back for a new determination in accordance with the principles
114. "Separation anxiety" National Post (13 July 1999) A19.
115. See e.g. W. Bauer, "The People Smugglers" Reader's Digest (August 1999). Bauer is a former
ambassador who recently shared his views with the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizen-
ship and Immigration. The Committee's study, "Refugee Protection and Border Security: Striking a
Balance," was tabled in March 2000. A transcript of Bauer's testimony as well as the Committee's
full report is available online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca>.
116. See K. D'Aoust, "Canada's policies on refugees: an issue of responsibility"; N. Sharma, "Exposing
the real snakeheads" (OctJNov. 1999) Kenisis at 9-11; and, in the American context, P. Kwong,
Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor (New York: The New Press,
1997).
117. An in-depth analysis of the interplay between globalization, migration and immigration law is beyond the
scope of this paper. For further reading, see D. Stasiulis & A. Bakan, "Negotiating the Citizenship
Divide: Legal Strategies of Foreign Domestic Workers" in R. Jhappan, Women's Legal Strategies: A
Friendly Assessment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming); and A. Macklin, "Women
as Migrants: Members in National and Global Communities" (1999) 19:3 C.W.S. 24.
118. See D. Stasiulus, supra note 111.
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enunciated by the Supreme Court. 119 As noted in LG. v. Canada, a recent judgment
of the Federal Court - Trial Division,
Not only does Baker require a more focused approach by immigration officers, it
places a new and more "hands-on" responsibility by a reviewing judge. A reviewing
judge must take a "hard look" at the "H & C" decision, must assess whether it is
reasonable by examining the reasons to see if they stand up... .120
In Sovalbarro v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) a judicial review
of a negative H & C decision involving a family that included both citizen and
non-citizen children, the Federal Court set aside the immigration officer's decision for
failing "to give proper consideration to the interests of the applicants' Canadian born
son and their other children."' 121 Similarly, in Navaratnam v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration),122 the Federal Court set aside a reviewing officer's
decision in the case of a Sri Lankan woman who was a failed refugee claimant. During
her time in Canada Ms. Navaratnam met and married a Canadian citizen and the couple
had a daughter. The applicant's husband sought to sponsor her for landing within
Canada, which even for spouses, is a discretionary application requiring an H & C
exemption. When the application was denied Ms. Navaratnam sought judicial review.
The Court allowed the application on the basis that the officer's notes failed to
emphasize the rights, interests and needs of their young daughter.
123
There are signs, however, that the Federal Court may be less willing to follow the
Baker ruling in cases where the applicant's criminality is identified as the counterpoint
to any rights of the applicant's child or the family as a unit. In Martin v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 124 the applicant had been ordered deported
in 1984 as a result of his criminal convictions, a decision that was challenged but
ultimately upheld by the Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board in
1995. In the meantime he married and had a child and subsequently attempted to
119. See e.g., Liang v. Canada supra note 86; Lewis v. Canada [1999] F.C.J. No. 1367 (T.D.), online:
QL (FCJ); Teresa v. Canada [1999] F.C.J. No. 1200 (T.D.), online: QL (FCJ); Haghighi v. Canada
[1999] F.C.J. 1367 (T.D.), online: QL (FCJ); With regard to the application of the principles in Baker
for persons who are outside Canada, see Khairoodin v. Canada [1999] F.C.J. 1256 (T.D.), online:
QL (FCJ); Xu v. Canada supra note 86; Ali v. Canada [1999] F.CJ. No. 1649, online: QL (FCJ).
Note, however, that two recent judgments have declined to follow Baker. In Veluppilai v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] F.CJ. No. 1955 (T.D.) at para. 38, Teitelbaum J.
held that a "danger to the public" determination was not comparable to an H & C decision, and that
the Minister does not have to give specific reasons for this purely discretionary decision." Interest-
ingly the case of Bhagwandass v. Canada [1999] F.C.J. No. 1227 (T.D.), a decision of Gibson J.,
came to exactly the opposite conclusion in very similar circumstances. The second case to explicitly
refuse to apply Baker is Martin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J.
No. 1517 (T.D.), online: QL (FCJ), discussed infra.
120. LG. v. Canada [1999] F.C.J. No. 1704 (T.D), online: QL (FCJ).
121. Sovalbarro v. Canada [1999] F.C.J. 1394 (T.D.) at para. 9, online: QL (FCJ).
122. [1999] F.C.J. No. 1870 (T.D.), online: QL (FCJ).
123. Ibid. at para. 14.
124. Supra note 119.
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reopen his case based on the interests of his young child. His application for a stay of
the removal order was denied by the Federal Court on the basis that Martin had failed
to demonstrate irreparable harm. The Court's failure in Baker to clearly restrict the
state interests that may be invoked to justify a departure from the best interests
principle led to the following reasoning by Blais J.:
This case is different from the Baker case, in this case the applicant has a child and
this child probably will stay with his mother and be safe. If the applicant is deported
pursuant to the deportation order, he will obviously suffer some inconvenience but
her is aware since 15 years that this deportation order is pending and he was also
aware that when they made the decision to have this child, the deportation order
could be executed at any time.
The notion that a child should be deprived of access to one of his or her parents simply
because the father made the inconvenient decision of having the child in the first place
serves to underscore the extent to which Baker has yet to fully permeate the judicial
landscape. Nevertheless, it is certainly evident that the Federal Court is attempting to
respond to the implications of the Supreme Court's decision. In constract, the immigra-
tion bureaucracy has resisted any direct engagement with the ruling. Nine months after
the Court's decision, the Department has not integrated the ruling into operational
guidelines and appears to be committed to restricting the scope of its application. An
internal memorandum issued in September 1999 from the Ontario Region concerning
the removal of persons with pending H & C applications is indicative of the
Department's approach. The memorandum indicates that the removal officers should
"exercise good judgment when prioritizing their removal workload" and that "barring
any exceptional circumstances where deferral may be justified pending the H.C.
application, removal should proceed in the normal manner." 125 The memorandum
fails to make any mention of the best interests of children as a relevant factor in the
officer's exercise of "good judgment", nor is there any indication that the Baker ruling
might have implications for the manner in which removal decisions are made.
Another manifestation of the Department's resistance to reforming the practices in the
post-Baker era is a recent decision of an immigration officer that is currently the
subject of a pending judicial review application. In Antonio v. Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration126 the applicant is the mother and sole care giver of her two Canadian
daughters who are respectively, six and three years of age. Ms. Antonio came to
Canada from the Philippines with her husband in 1990. In addition to her children,
she has an extensive network of family and friends who are citizens or permanent
residents. In 1999 an H & C application was submitted on behalf of the family but
before it was even considered Ms. Antonio's husband was deported. Supporting the
H & C application was a report by a respected psychologist indicating that the children
would suffer irreparable harm if separated from either their Canadian family or the
125. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Removal of Persons with pending H.C. applications" by R.
Manzel, Director, Enforcement, Ontario Region, (23 September, 1999).
126. [2000] IMM-217-00 (T.D.), (Applicant's Memorandum of Argument) [hereinafter Antonio].
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applicant and that it was in the best interests of the children that they remain in Canada
with the applicant.
Ms. Antonio was arrested by Department officials while in the office of her lawyer
and she and her children were detained. They were released the following day after
her lawyer sought an order of a provincial superior court judge.127 In November 1999
the applicant was given approximately four days notice of an interview related to her
H & C application. Her lawyer's request for a brief postponement was denied and the
interview proceeded in the absence of counsel. During the interview the immigration
officer cross-examined Ms. Antonio's six year old child, asking her whether she
wanted to live in the Philippines and whether she had seen a psychologist. The young
girl replied that she hadn't seen a psychologist. At the interview the officer showed
the applicant a letter from a social services agency of which the applicant had no prior
knowledge and had been the subject of a specific disclosure request by her lawyer.
There were numerous other procedural problems in the course of the interview,
including inadequate interpretation. 128
The officer rejected Ms. Antonio's H & C application, suggesting that the
psychologist's report was not credible given her daughter's response that she had not
seen a psychologist. Although the officer's notes included several references to the
applicant's children, he concludes that even the six year old "was not so immersed as
to make her incapable of adapting to life in the Philippines. She acknowledges a
comprehension of Filipino though her mother states that she only understands but
cannot speak it."129 It would appear, at least in the Antonio case, that the Baker ruling
has not resulted in any greater attention on the part of Department officials to issues
of fairness on the front lines of decision-making. As Ms. Antonio's counsel aptly
asserts, given the age of the child and the likelihood of the child's knowledge of the
meaning of the term "psychologist", there was an insufficient basis to discount the
credibility of the psychologist's report.130 He has cited the ruling in Baker and the
CRC to support his submissions and argues that the cumulative conduct of the Minister
constitutes bias. 131
127. Ibid. at para. 14-15. It deserves mention that immigration detention is considered preventive rather
then punitive. The only basis upon which individuals may be subject to arrest and immigration
detention, is where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they pose a danger to the public or
that they would not appear for an examination, inquiry or removal. When someone has an H & C
process pending, has maintained contact with the Department through their counsel and where there
are no criminality or security concerns, as in the case of Ms. Antonio and her daughters, jurispru-
dence suggests that detention would not be justified. While the children, as Canadian citizens, would
not have been subject to the detention order, as a practical matter, their mother may have had no
recourse but to have them accompany her. See Sahin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigra-
tion), [1995] 1 F.C. 214 (T.D.).
128. Ibid. at paras. 2-29, 40-52.
129. Ibid. at paras. 47, 50-51.
130. Ibid. at para. 51.
131. Ibid. at para. 52.
(2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy
It is evident that as the courts confront a changed judicial landscape in the aftermath
of Baker, the immigration bureaucracy is resisting reform. Currently, the fate of Ms.
Antonio and her daughters is pending before the Federal Court. For the Antonio
children, the Baker ruling has not afforded much protection. In the event that the
Federal Court fails them, they could consider returning to the provincial superior court
for a remedy. In the following section we trace the evolution of provincial superior
court involvement in immigration matters with a particular focus on child litigants
seeking to maintain their families together in Canada.
VI. PROVINCIAL SUPERIOR COURTS AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
While Baker affirmed the right of children to have their interests considered in a
humanitarian and compassionate application initiated by their parents, the ruling
leaves significant gaps in legal protection for children. First, at the procedural level,
there remains an absence of meaningful participatory rights. Children do not have
independent rights of notice and participation at the first instance. In terms of judicial
recourse, children are unable to challenge the constitutional validity of a deportation
order involving their parent in Federal Court. Second, at the substantive level, there
is no parallel in Canadian law to the child's right to family unity as affirmed in the
Convention as well as other international and regional human rights instruments. As
we will elaborate subsequently, Canadian law does give expression to the "best
interests" principle, but it in the post- Baker universe, this principle has not found full
expression in the scheme of immigration law, policy and decision-making. In an effort
to address this human rights gaps for children in immigration matters, litigants have
sought redress in provincial superior courts. A brief review the jurisdictional interplay
between the Federal Court and provincial superior courts will assist in our discussion
of the way forward for children's rights in the immigration context.
In 1986, only a few years after the Charter of Rights had been adopted, the Supreme
Court held that there must always be a court to grant an appropriate remedy.132 The
implication of that decision was that in cases where the Federal Court and provincial
superior courts shared concurrent jurisdiction, applicants could count on seeking relief
before a section 96 court where recourse to the Federal Court had been exhausted or
where such recourse presented a juridical disadvantage. In 1994, in the case of Reza
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the Supreme Court restricted
the opportunity for applicants to seek relief in provincial superior courts in immigra-
tion related matters. 133 The Court held that a failed refugee claimant fearing removal
to Iran and the violation of his rights under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, did not
132. R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 at 882, Lamer J.
133. [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394 [hereinafter Reza]. See also Peiroo v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 253
at 261 (C.A.). In that case the issue was whether a provincial superior court should intervene in an
immigration matter through the exercise of its habeus corpus jurisdiction. The appeal court con-
cluded that before doing so it would have to be demonstrated that the available review and appeal
process established by Parliament is inappropriate or less advantageous than the habeus corpus
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ontario.
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have guaranteed access to a provincial superior court, even in circumstances where
all remedies before the Federal Court had been exhausted. For applicants seeking to
enforce their Charter rights in immigration cases, the Supreme Court had reduced
access to the provincial superior courts to a matter of judicial discretion. 134 Although
the provincial superior court had the jurisdiction to consider Mr. Reza's application,
the judge declined to exercise that jurisdiction and the Supreme Court ruled that such
an exercise of discretion would not be interfered with, provided sufficient weight had
been given to "relevant considerations." While the Federal Court and provincial
superior courts share a concurrent jurisdiction with regard to Constitutional matters,
Reza supports the proposition that provincial superior courts should defer to the
Federal Court because of its "greater expertise in and an exclusive mandate over the
review of immigration matters." 135 The objectives of avoiding forum shopping,
inconsistency of decisions and multiplicity of proceedings have been cited by the
Minister in subsequent cases in support of a narrow reading of the ruling in Reza.
136
Despite the ruling in Reza, a range of constitutional issues arising in the context of
immigration proceedings continues to be litigated in provincial superior courts. Judges
at first instance have been willing to intervene to stay deportation orders where serious
human rights issues have been at stake, the applicant has demonstrated that Federal
Court remedies are less than comprehensive and the issues have been successfully
characterized as constitutional. 137 Recourse to provincial superior courts has been
particularly important for the children of non-citizen parents seeking to halt the
imminent deportation of a family member. In this context the children have invoked
134. See Eliadis, supra note 63 at 146-147.
135. Reza, supra note 132 at 404-5.
136. See e.g. Torres-Samuels v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 166 D.L.R.
(4th) 611 (B.C. C.A.).
137. See Re Suresh & R. (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 267 (Gen. Div.). In this case security certificates had been
issued against a convention refugee on the basis that there were reasonable grounds to believe that he
was a member of a Sri Lankan terrorist organization. Mr. Suresh was ordered deported. He com-
menced an application in Federal Court for judicial review challenging the constitutionality of the
deportation order and the legislation that it was based on. He also applied for a stay of his removal
order on the grounds that he was at serious risk of imprisonment, torture and death if he was returned
to Sri Lanka That application was refused by an order of the Federal Court from which there was no
appeal. The applicant brought an application in Ontario Court (General Division) seeking a declara-
tion that the removal order and the Immigration Act provisions on which it was based were unconsti-
tutional and seeking a stay of removal, pending the outcome of the application. The Minister moved
for an order staying the proceedings in the Ontario Court on the basis that the matter was still before
the Federal Court and "discretion and comity" should justify a decision by the provincial superior
court not to intervene. Ultimately the motions judge stayed the declaratory component of the applica-
tion (as that component was the basis of ongoing litigation in the Federal Court) but granted
injunctive relief to Mr. Suresh, restraining the government from removing him until after his applica-
tion for judicial review in the Federal Court was determined. Lane J. stated that "... to offer the
Applicant a forum to review his constitutional rights, and then to deport him before the constitution-
ality of his deportation is resolved would be an affront to Canadian ideas of justice .... " Lane J.'s
decision was approved by the Divisional Court (R. v. Suresh (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 793). See also
Francis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 74, discussed
above.
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the residual parens patriae jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts, ajurisdiction
which the Federal Court lacks. The parens patriae jurisdiction evolved from the
ancient tradition of common law courts intervening in circumstances where dependant
children were in need of protection.1 38
In the case of Juste v. Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the important
role of provincial superior courts in protecting the rights of children at risk of harm. 139
Ingrid Harper was a woman who fled Dominica as a result of a severely abusive
relationship. Her refugee claim, based on a prolonged history of domestic violence,
was rejected by the Immigration and Refugee Board. At the time her claim was
considered, the tribunal had not yet adopted guidelines with regard to women fearing
gender-related persecution. Her two children and one grandchild applied to the
provincial superior court for a remedy, requesting that the court exercise its parens
patriae jurisdiction to ensure that the interests of the children were protected. Before
the court could consider the merits of the children's case, the Minister's counsel
objected on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that immigration matters should be dealt
with by the Federal Court under the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Immigra-
tion Act. The Ontario Court of Appeal adjourned the Minister's appeal until the final
status of Ms. Harper had been determined, given that the government had consented
to considering a fresh humanitarian and compassionate application. The Court of
Appeal exercised its jurisdiction for the purpose of monitoring the children's interests
until they had been determined to its satisfaction. The interim endorsement stated that
the circumstances of this case raised "very real concerns to this court in its parens
patriae jurisdiction and the need to protect the children from harm to them through
harm to their mother."140
In a similar vein, the Ontario Court (General Division) quashed a deportation order
against Maria Joyce Francis, a woman from Grenada who was the sole parent of three
children, two girls aged six and eight years and a boy with special needs aged fifteen
years. 141 The two sisters were Canadian citizens born and living in Canada. Their
138. See Gamble v. R., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595; Beson v. Newfoundland (Director of Child Welfare), [1982]
2 S.C.R. 716; In Eve v. E., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388 at 425, the Supreme Court analyzed the history and
scope of the parens patriae jurisdiction: "In early England, the parens patriae jurisdiction was
confined to mental incompetents, but its rationale is obviously applicable to children and, following
the transfer of that jurisdiction to the Lord Chancellor in the seventeenth century, he extended it to
children under wardship, and it is in this context that the bulk of modem cases on the subject arise.
The parens patriae jurisdiction was later vested in the provincial superior court of this country, and in
particular, those of Prince Edward Island. The parens patriae jurisdiction is ... founded on necessity,
namely the need to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves. The courts have
frequently stated that it is to be exercised in the "best interest" of the protected person, or again, for
his or her "benefit" or "welfare". It is a discretion, too, that must at all times be exercised with
great caution, a caution that must be redoubled as the seriousness of the matter increases. This is
particularly so in cases where a court might be tempted to act because failure to do so would risk
imposing an obviously heavy burden on some other individual."
139. Juste, Winston and Harper through their Litigation guardian June Callwood v. Canada, (A.G.),
[1997] O.J. No. 3331 (C.A.), online: QL (ORP).
140. Ibid. at para. 9.
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brother was born in Grenada and came to Canada at age seven. The Court at first
instance found that the Charter was engaged on behalf of the Canadian children of a
potential deportee. Specifically, the children had a liberty interest grounded in part on
the right to remain in Canada pursuant to section 6 of the Charter. McNeely J. noted
that it was self-evident that to deport the sole parent of the children was to deport or
exile the children themselves. The so-called "choices" available to the children to go
with their mother or remain in Canada were not genuine choices, but, rather, state
compelled. The Court dealt with the participatory rights of the children as principles
of fundamental justice and relied upon articles 3, 9 and 12 of the Convention as
indicators of the "views of justice".142 McNeely J. held that forcing the removal of
the children by deporting their mother was a sufficiently direct interference with the
section 7 liberty rights of the Canadian children that the procedures leading to such
action must comply with the requirements of natural justice. In immigration proceed-
ings pertaining to a parent, those requirements at a minimum would encompass the
identification of children, some notice to them of the proceedings and some method of
seeing that their rights and interests were considered. The Court found that the oldest
child, as an alien "with no right to remain in Canada", raised different considerations. The
Court was unable to review the merits of his claims due to the absence of information in
the record before it. Nevertheless, McNeely J. ruled that it would be inappropriate to
dismiss his application. The Court concluded that all three children would be severely and
adversely impacted by any removal from Canada and that it was in the best interest of
all three that they remain in Canada with their mother and in her care. 143
The Minister appealed McNeely J.'s ruling and in October 1999 the Ontario Court of
Appeal released a brief decision granting the appeal on the basis that the Baker
decision had eliminated the uncertainty in the law with regard to children. In particular,
the appeal court reasoned, it was clear after Baker that the interests of children could
be properly considered where a parent makes an application under subsection 114(2)
of the Immigration Act and there was no need to resort to the parens patriaejurisdiction
of the provincial superior court. The exercise of jurisdiction by the provincial superior
court would be justified only in "rare cases." This decision is currently on leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court.144 The appellant is arguing, inter alia, that the effect of
141. Francis (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998), 40 O.R.
(3d) 74 [hereinafter Francis]. See also Ratnavel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)
(12 March 1999), 99-CV-163413 (Ont. Gen. Div.), where the Court issued injunctive relief in an
application brought by children of a parent under a deportation order; Nunez v. Canada (Solicitor
General) (11 July 1996), CA 018241, CA 018242, CA 019595, CA 019596 (B.C.C.A.), digested at
10 O.F.L.R. 23, where decisions by motions judges staying proceedings in four cases were set aside
because their reasons did not disclose sufficient consideration to the existence of theirparens patriae
jurisdiction before the applications were stayed. In contrast, a completely opposite approach was
adopted in John (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1998),
46 Imm. L.R. (2d) 112 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Jones v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999]
O.J. No. 1379 (QL).
142. Francis, ibid. at paras. 10, 12
143. Ibid.
144. [1999] O.J. No. 3853 (QL) (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. pending, Court File 27615.
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the Federal Court Act, 145 in the circumstances of Canadian children, cannot be to
exclude the "superintending and reforming" power of the superior court as it relates
to children whose interests will otherwise not be directly and independently consid-
ered. Afurther issue relates to the appeal court's ruling that exercise of aparenspatrae
jurisdiction is an act that must necessarily be assigned to a rare case. 14 6
One concern about the manner in which the issues in Francis have been framed in the
applicants' leave application is that a distinction has been drawn between the rights
of the eldest son, who is not a citizen, and the younger children, who are seeking
Charter relief based on their status as Canadians.147 This is a potentially dangerous
invitation for the privileging of certain children over others based on status, a
distinction that the CRC tells us should be irrelevant in determining the best interests
of children. This point deserves particular attention as the government has increasingly
invoked lack of statutory citizenship as a basis for stripping away the right to remain
in Canada even in cases of long-term domicile in the country. Why should children
who may have lived in Canada since infancy, but by the mere fact of their place of
birth and parents' nationality, be subject to lesser protection than those who happened
to have been born in here? In an effects based analysis, as mandated in R. v. Big M.
Drug Mart,148 the impact of a negative H & C decision would be the same for all
children, regardless of status. It should be noted that the ruling in Baker was not
confined to citizen children.
In Solis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),149 a long-term resident
sought to challenge the public danger procedures which resulted in his deportation
from Canada. The appellant argued that the word "citizen" in the Charter should be
accorded a meaning independent of the Citizenship Act. He asserted that whether or
not a person is a member of the Canadian community for the purposes of section 6 of
the Charter should be a question of fact, determined with reference to the nature of
the person's connections to Canada. 150 The Federal Court of Appeal ruled against
Solis, holding that citizenship is entirely a "creature of federal statute law." 151
However, there is some support for the position advanced by the appellant in Solis in
American jurisprudence as well as in international law with regard to nationality.152
145. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
146. Francis (Through their Litigation Guardian) v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, Court File
No. 27615 (22 November 1999) (S.C.C.) (Appellant's factum).
147. Ibid. at para. 29.
148. [1985] 1.S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 58 N.R. 81.
149. (28 March 2000), 360-98 (F.C.A.).
150. Ibid. (Appellant's factum).
151. Ibid. at para. 4 The Court cited P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1992) at 833 as support for its view that citizenship has no meaning apart from statute. The decision
will be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In Frankowski v. Canada, T- 1663-99 (F.C.T.D.),
scheduled for hearing in August 2000, the Federal Court will be afforded an opportunity to revisit its
views about citizenship. Mr. Frankowski will raise the arguments advanced in Solis in his challenge
of the Department's decision rejecting his citizenship application.
Baker v. Canada and the Rights of Children
In the immigration context the issues for children are identical whether they them-
selves are the subject of a deportation order or it is one of their family members. A
principled way of resolving this dilemma would be to use the CRC as the starting point
and proceed on the basis that all children have a right to family unity, subject to their
best interests, as well as the right not to be evicted from their community, subject to
the links they have established and the harm they would suffer if forced to leave.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to recognize an unqualified right to family unity, the
entitlement of children, in their own right, to a relationship with their family members
under either section 2 or 7 of the Charter, or more radically, to import a constitutional
notion of citizenship into deliberations concerning the expulsion of long-term resi-
dents. In addition to the somewhat confusing and contradictory rulings of various
provincial superior courts with regard to the interplay between the provincial domain
of "protection and civil rights" and the federal domain of immigration law, there are
conflicting decisions with regard to the application of section 7 of the Charter to the
interests of children in their relationship with family members.
In R. (B). v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, a constitutional challenge
to provincial child welfare legislation, the Supreme Court recognized a parental right
to care for one's children, ruling that the right to nurture a child, to care for its
development and to make decisions for it in fundamental matters such as medical care,
are part of the liberty interest of a parent, as guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter.
Eight of the nine justices in their minority judgments recognized a constitutionally
protected right of family integrity, subject only to state interference on the basis of
measurable grounds such as best interests of the child. Cory, lacobucci and Major JJ.
approached the analysis from the standpoint of the section 7 rights of the child to life,
liberty and security of the person, emphasizing that there was no room within section
7 for parents to override the child's right to life and security of the person. To hold
otherwise would be to risk undermining the ability of the state to exercise its legitimate
parens patriae jurisdiction and jeopardize the Charter goal of protecting the most
vulnerable members of society. 153
In view of the Supreme Court's recent decision in New Brunswick (Minister of Health
and Community Services) v. G. (J.),154 in which the right of a mother to legal aid
152. American courts have found that the notion of citizenship in the U.S. Constitution has a meaning
which may differ from the statutory meaning. On this basis various statutory schemes revoking
citizenship have been held unconstitutional. See, for example, Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. (1958);
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 372 U.S. 144 (1953); Schneider v. Rusk 377 U.S. 163 (1964);
Afroyim v. Rusk 387 U.S. 353 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas 444 U.S. 252 (1980). In the Nottebohm
Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] I.CJ. Rep. 4 at 23, the International Court of Justice found
that a person's factual situation and in particular, whether they had a "genuine and effective link"
with a territory should be the criteria for determining nationality.
153. [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 at 431-434.
154. (1999), 50 R.F.L. (4th) 62, 66 C.R.R. (2d) 267 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter G.(J.) cited to R.F.L.].
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assistance for a child protection proceeding was recognized as a section 7 security
interest, it would appear that there is an opening to raise the matter of the child's right
to association with their family members under the rubric of section 7. In G. (J.) the
Court held that the right to security of the person guaranteed by section 7 protects both
the physical and psychological integrity of the individual and that state removal of a
child from parental custody constitutes a serious interference with the psychological
integrity of the parent. The Court noted the "obvious distress arising from loss of
companionship of the child".155
The challenge in addressing the needs of children in the immigration context is that
in order to give meaningful expression to their rights, a broader human rights frame-
work must necessarily be adopted. To the extent that resistance to this framework
continues to inform decisions and policies that have an impact on children, this can
be understood as a function of an overarching unwillingness to afford primacy to
human rights in the face of a state interest in immigration control. In this regard it is
instructive to consider state resistance from the wider optic of the government's recent
responses to the views and recommendations of international and regional human
rights bodies. Whereas in the past the federal government had an uneven record in
terms of how quickly remedial action was taken to comply with the rulings of these
bodies, there appears to have been a policy shift in the past few years. Now the problem
is not a matter of the how slowly the government responds but whether it will respond
at all. In 1997 Canada flouted an interim measures request from the United Nations
Committee Against Torture not to execute a deportation order and in 1998, ignored a
similar request from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 156 In 1999,
in its concluding observations concerning Canada, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee expressed concern about the Canadian government's view that it was not
required to comply with interim measures requests. The Committee also indicated its
continuing concern about Canada's policy in relation to the expulsion of long-term
illegals without giving full consideration to the protection of children and the fam-
ily. 157 Most recently, in Waldman v. Canada,158 a ruling of the United Nations Human
155. Ibid. at 101.
156. The cases were Tejinder Pal Singh v. Canada and San Vincente v. Canada, respectively. Interim or
precautionary measures are akin to temporary injunctions. A state may be requested, for example, to
refrain from doing a particular action pending the tribunal's review of the admissibility and merits of
the complaint or petition. See "Canada deports Venezualan" The Globe and Mail (13 March 1998)
A7. For an overview of both the U.N treaty bodies and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights with specific reference to relevant jurisprudence concerning non-citizen's rights in Canada,
see S. Aiken, ed., Human Rights for Refugees and Immigrants: The Canadian Guide to International
and Regional Human Rights Mechanisms (Canadian Bar Association, forthcoming 2000); and S.
Aiken and T. Clark, "International Procedures for Protecting the Human Rights of Non-Citizens'
(1994) 10J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 182.
157. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Canada, 65th Session, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
79/Add.105 (7 April 1999) at paras. 14-15. The full text can be found online: Canadian Heritage,
Human Rights Directorate Homepage <http://www.pch.gc.ca/ddp-hrd/ENGLISHICovenant.htm>.
158. CCPRIC/67/D/694/1996 (4 November 1999); in this case the Committee found that Canada was
engaging in religious discrimination because Roman Catholics in Ontario receive full funding for
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Rights Committee, on a non-immigration matter, the federal government asserted that
the decision was not binding as the Committee has merely "advisory jurisdiction". 159
The government's cavalier response to the Human Rights Committee seems to be
indicative of an increasingly anti-international and anti-human rights sensibility. This
sensibility has particularly serious consequences for the children of foreign-born
parents regardless of the children's own citizenship status.
The Supreme Court's decision in Baker was a step forward in terms of taking children's
rights seriously in the immigration context, an area in which notions of privilege and
national interest, rather than rights, permeate both legal and political discourse.
Nevertheless, the absence of explicit legislative protection for both resident and
domiciled alien children in matters related to deportation, remains a serious deficiency
in Canada's immigration scheme. In 1995 the Committee on the Rights of the Child
suggested that Canada was not meeting its international obligations to protect children
and families. Five years have passed since Canada received its UN report card but
there is still no reference to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the
Immigration Act and its inclusion in policy guidelines in permissive, discretionary
terms rather than as a mandatory requirement, underscores just how little substantive
progress has been achieved. In March of this year the Inter-American Commission
released its long awaited report concerning an on-site visit to Canada made in 1997
to observe, inter alia, the "availability and scope of judicial protection for the rights
of Canadian-born children directly affected by proceedings to remove a non-citizen
parent or parents from Canada." 160 The report, although couched in typically diplo-
matic language, highlights a number of concerns with regard to the legislative and
administrative framework for immigration and refugee protection. In relation to
respect for the rights of the child and family life in removal proceedings, the Com-
mission recommended action aimed at enhancing:
1. The compliance of decision-making at all levels of the process with the obliga-
tion to take the best interest of the child into account in all decisions that affect
him or her, and to assure that, where a child is capable of expressing his or her
views, those will be taken into account... [I]n view of the importance of ensuring
religious schools while every other religion receives nothing. The ruling stated that funding was not
required but where a government chooses to fund religious schools it must do so on a non-discrimi-
natory basis. The Human Rights Committee was clear in its statement that Canada was in violation
of its treaty obligations.
159. Letter from Hon. L. Axworthy to A.H. Waldman (24 February 2000). Note that one of the explana-
tions offered by the federal government for failing to comply with the Committee's decision in
Waldman was that education is within provincial jurisdiction and therefore beyond its control. This
rationale runs counter to art. 50 of the JCCPR, which states that treaty provisions extend to all parts
of federal states, without any limits or exceptions. While unincorporated treaties may not be directly
enforceable in Canadian law, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, Canada
explicitly undertook to give effect to the decisions of the Human Rights Committee and to provide a
remedy when the Committee determines that there has been a treaty violation.
160. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum
Seekers within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, adopted March 2000, online: Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Homepage <www.cidh.org>.
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that the best interests of such a child are properly considered in any determination
affecting him or her, the Commission recommends that further steps be taken to
clarify how that standard is to be applied by decision-makers at all levels, in
accordance with ... the American Declaration, interpreted in conjunction with
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
2. The conformity of decision-making at all levels with the international obligation
to consider the principle of family reunification and family unity.
3. The adherence of such decisions to the standard by which removals separating
families are a highly exceptional measure requiring as extremely serious justi-
fication to override the resulting interference with family life. 161
The Commission's blueprint for reform is one we strongly endorse. In this regard it
should be noted that Citizenship and Immigration Minister Elinor Caplan recently
introduced Bill C-31, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 162 An attempt to
respond to the Commission's observations and the Baker ruling can be seen in the
Bill's explicit reference to the "best interests of the child" in a number of provisions.
With regard to H & C decisions, the Bill states that "the Minister must take into account
the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision." 163 That the language is
mandatory and proposed for the statute itself rather than a policy guideline, is
significant. Yet the Bill still fails to incorporate the more exacting norms and standards
required by the CRC. In the absence of any direction regarding the priority to be
ascribed to a child's interests, both immigration officials and judges are likely to view
the Bill's new provisions as little more than symbolic window dressing.
The courts occupy an intermediate space in the balance of power between the children
of non-citizen parents and the state seeking to maintain its grip on immigration control.
While judicial pronouncements rarely generate fundamental, systemic reform, by
granting leave in the Francis case, the Supreme Court could seize the opportunity to
narrow the gaps between Canada's international human rights commitments and its
domestic practice. Weaving together the disparate strands of L.L.A. and O'Connor,
R.(B)., G.(J.), Eaton and Baker, the Court could make a definitive statement that
affirms both the due process and substantive rights of children. In order for the Court
to fully embrace this opportunity, it must approach such issues as the right to parental
care and family unity as well as the right to remain, from the standpoint of children.
The framework must be one of "children's rights as human rights" in order to arrive
at a long over-due, comprehensive recognition of children as independent, rights-bear-
ing individuals. In terms of the broader spectrum of children's rights, the future will
be informed by the responses of both the courts and government. As we inch our way
toward true justice for children, the judgment in Baker provides a useful starting point
but the Convention on the Rights of the Child should be the beacon.
161. Ibid. at para.180.
162. 2d Sess., 36th Parl., 2000 (1st reading 6 April, 2000).
163. Ibid., s. 22(2).
